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KOREA
SIXTI RAILWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1542-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Preface
This is a Project Completion Report (PCR) of the Sixth Railway
Project for which Loan 1542-KO was approved in March 1978 in the sum of US$120
million. The loan was fully disbursed and closed in December 1982, only s!x
months after the originally planned date.
The PCR was prepared by the East Asia and Pacific Transportation
Division I and is based on a review of the project files, information provided
by the Korean National Railroads (KNR) and additional data gathered during the
Project's final supervision in January-February 1983. The assistance of the
Government and KNR in particular, is gratefully acknowledged.
In accordance with the revised procedures for project performance
audit reporting, this PCR was read by the Operatinns Evaluation nePartment but
the project was not audited by OED snaff. The draft PCR was sent to the
Borrower who approved it without modifications (see attachment).
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KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECTS (LOA±l 1542-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Basic Data Sheet
Appraisal
Key Project Data estimate Actual
Total project cost (W billion) 197.1 262.5
Overrun (Z) 33
Loan amount (USs million) 120.0 120.0
Disbursed 120.0
Date physical components completed 12/31/81 12/31/82
Proportion completed by original date (Z) 98
Proportion of time overrun (Z) 2
Econonic rate of return (Z) 30 22
Financial performance /a
Institutional performance adequate
Other Project Data Orlginal plan Revisions Actual
First mention in files or timetable 10/75
Governments application -
gegotiations 02/12/78
Board approval 03/30/78
Loan agreement 04/10/78
Effectiveness 07/30/78 08/03/73 08/03/78
Closing date 06/30/82 12/31/82 12/31/82
Borrower executing agency KNR
Fiscal year of borrower 01/01-12/31
Follow-on project name Railways VII
No. of No. of
Mission Data month/year weeks persons Manr-weeks Date of reports
Identification
Preparation 04-05/76 1.0 2 2.0 05/21/76
Preappraisal 09-10/76 1.5 3 4.5
Appraisal 04-05/77 3.5 3 10.5
Post-appraisal 07/77 3.0 3 9.0 08/02/77
Subtotal 9.0 26.0
Supervision I 04/78 2.0 3 6.0 06/12/78
Supervision II 11/78 2.0 2 4.0 12/22/78
Supervision III 05-06/79 1.0 4 4.0 07/31/79
Supervision IV 01-02/80 1.0 3 3.0 04/21/80
Supervision V 07/80 0.5 2 1.0 08/07/30
Supervision VI 07/81 0.5 3 1.5 06/05/81
Supervision VII 02/82 0.5 3 1.5 03/Z6/82
Completion 01-02/d2 1.5 3 4.5 06/30/83
Subtotal 9.0 25.5
Total 18.0 51.5
Country Exchange Rates (Won (W))
Average exchange rate
Year (USS 1 in W)
1977 (appraisal year) 484.0
1978 484.0
1979 484.0
1980 607.4
1981 681.0
1982 731.1
1983 year of completion report n.a.
/a Financial objectives not reached due to slowdown in traffic demand growth as
a result of the country's economic downturn.
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KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1542-1-us
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Highlights
The project was the sixth Bank Group Operation in the railway sector
in Korea. It consisted of a two year tranche of the Fourth Five Year Plan
1977-81, namely the plan investments scheduled to start in 1978 and 1979
(paras. 2.02 and 2.03).
The project achieved its objectives to increase KNR's capacity while
improving operational efficiency and maintaining reasonable financial perfor-
mance. As passenger traffic increased faster than freight, the investment
plan was modified during implementation (para. 3.02). Modifications were in
general suitable except for the complete doubling of the Chung Bug Line which
was premature. After an exchange of views between the Government and the
Bank, the Government agreed to compensate KNR for its expenditures on this
line beyond the scope of the project (para. 3.03). Procurement for original
project items was completed ahead of schedule, but some delay occurred in
disbursement for additional items (para. 3.23). Project implementation was
satisfactory except for the economic feasibility study of major investments
for 1980 and 1981 financed under the technical assistance included in the
project (para. 3.24).
During the project period, freight and passenger tariffs increased
in real terms (para. 5.05). However, these increases were generally applied
across the board, and some rates, particularly for ordinary passenger trains,
still failed to cover costs (para. 5.07). As a result, KNR could not meet its
financial objectives; and remedial actions were included in subsequent
projects (paras. 5.16 to 5.18).
One aspect of this project's experience of more general interest is
the very close cooperation and dialogue maintained with KNR on investment
planning, traffic forecasting and financial/management policies and
planning. A flexible approach on both sides permitted adjustments in the
investment plan and in the project to best fit the needs of the rapidly
evolving Korean economy.
KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1542)
PROJECT COHPLETION REPORT
1. 'INTRODUCTION
1.01 Korea's remarkable economic growth over the last two decades has
been supported by an impressive development of its transport system. During
1961-78 transport demand grew faster than GNP. Domestic passenger traffic
increased thirteen times and freight six times while per capita income more
than tripled and real GNP multiplied five-fold.
1.02 To meet increasing demand for transport the Government embarked on
a heavy transport investment program. About 20% to 25% of public capital
expenditures were allocated to the transport sector during four successive
5-Year Economic Development Plans (1962-81). These considerable amounts
were mainly used for increasing and modernizing the capacity of all
transport means of the country.
1.03 The Bank has assisted Korea in reaching its transport objectives
through the provision of finance for implementing capacity increase
investments and technical advice aimed at optimizing use of available and
additional resources. US$434 million were financed by the Bank under seven
Railway projects to help modernize and expand rail capacity and improve the
Korean National Railroads (KNR) technical, managerial and financial
performance. US$147 million were financed under two ports projects to
introduce containerization in Busan and improve the organization and
management of ports. US$465 million were financed under five road projects
and a technical assistance credit to develop and maintain the national,
provincial and county road system.
1.04 By the end of 1977 the Bank had helped finance the following
railway projects:
Bank Loan/Credit
amount
Project Year Loan/Credit (US$ million)
First Railway Project 1962 Credit 25-KO 14.0
Second Railway Project 1967 Credit 110-KO 11.0
Third Railway Project 1970 Credit 183-KO 15.0
Loan 669-KO 40.0
Fourth Railway Project 1972 Loan 863-KO 40.0
Fifth Railway Project 1974 Loan 1101-KO 100.0
Subsequent to the Sixth Railway Project the Government and the Bank agreed
on a Seventh Railway Project estimated to cost US$604.3 million of which
US$94 million would be financed from Loan 1836-RO.
1.05 Bank railway projects in Korea were aimed at improving KNR's
organization and developing its assets. Until 1963, KNR was an integral part
of the Ministry of Transportation; it had neither separate legal status nor
indepedent management. In 1963, as required under the First Railway Project
KNR was established as a semi-autonomous entity with its own manager, budget
and accounting. The revised organization was an improvement, but there was
still an excessive degree of dependence on, and control by, the Government in
financial, budgeting and staff matters. At the Bank's request, the Govern-
ment later agreed on measures giving slightly increased powers to KNR manage-
ment, and enabling KNR to concentrate on installing and operating commercial
budgeting and accounting systems. While the situation improved somewhat as a
result of these steps, KNR'B freedom of action continued to be hampered by
the Government's strict control of budgets and tariffs. With pay scales tied
to those of the Government's civil service, the railway has had difficulties
in attracting and retaining certain specialized technical staff, notably
accountants, economists and computer specialists.
1.06 Korea's railway system consists of 3,111 route-km of standard gauge
(1.435 m) lines of which 607 km are double track and of 53 km of narrow-gauge
(1.067 m) lines, linking major production and consumption areas and seaports
(Map 13134). The narrow gauge Su-In line (Suweon-Incheon) will be widened to
the standard gauge by end 1986 to handle anticipated imports of anthracite
and bituminous coal through the Incheon Port Coal terminal presently under
construction. The Bank will contribute to the financing of this terminal and
the widening of the Su-In line as part of the Coal and Cement Distribution
Project, the relevant loan of which was approved by the Board on April 26,
1983. Many lines pass through mountainous areas, requiring steep gradients
and numerous sharp curves. Rails are mainly 50 kg/m, generally laid on
wooden sleepers; concrete sleepers are being used as replacements on the
higher speed lines. Operational performance is good and staff productivity
high. Bank-financed railway projects have helped improve KNR's ability and
efficiency to carry increasing quantities of freight, particularly coal and
cement produced in the northeastern part of the country, and of rapidly
growing passenger transport demand, largely in the Seoul area and the
Seoul-Busan corridor.
1.07 The scope and content of the Sixth Railway Project are described in
paras 2.03 and 2.04. The following Completion Report is based on information
provided by KNR in compliance with Section 3.04 (c) of Loan Agreement
1542-KO, additional data gathered during the Project's final supervision in
January-February 1983 and a review of the Bank's files in Washington.
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2. PROJECT PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL
2.01 The possibility of a Sixth Railway Project was first mentioned in
writing in late 1975, about the same time as the first draft of KNR's
Investment Plan for 1977-1981 was prepared. The project was identified
during a supervision mission in April 1976. The Investment Plan was further
discussed during a preappraisal mission in September-October 1976 and the
appraisal mission in April-May 1977, however basic agreement on the size of
the plan was reached only during a post-appraisal mission in June-July 1977
and further minor reductions were undertaken during the continued preparation
works.
2.02 The investment plan agreed to at negotiations totalled R 503 billion
(US$1037 million) with a foreign exchange component of W 211 billion
(US$436 million) or about 43% . Its breakdown is given below.
Cost (W billion) Z
Local Saen Total of total
New line construction 11.0 - 11.0 2.2
Electrification 4.7 4.0 8.7 1.7
Increase in station
and line capacity 86.2 9.6 95.8 19.0
Way and structures 42.0 18.2 60.2 12.0
Motive power and rolling 46.2 133.0. 179.2 35.7
stock
Rolling stock repair
facilities 15.7 8.9 24.6 4.9
Telecommunications, power
facilities, buildings and
others 17.7 1.6 19.3 3.8
Total Base Cost 223.5 175.3 398.8 79.3
Physical contingencies 16.6 2.6 19.2
Price contingencies 51.5 33.4 84.9 16.9
Total 291.6 211.3 502.9 100.0
(US$ million) 601.3 435.7 1037.0)
2.03 The project consisted of the plan investments starting in 1978
and 1979. The total project cost was W 197 billion (US$406) million of
which W 92 billion (US$190 million) or about 47%, in foreign currency. A
breakdown of the project cost is given in the following table:
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Cost (W billion) X
Local Foreign Total of total
New line construction 2.3 - 2.3 1.2
Electrification 0.8 0.8 1.6 0.8
Increase in station
and line capacity 29.5 3.5 33.0 16.7
Way and structures 20.9 7.2 28.1 14.3
Motive power and rolling
stock 11.7 61.3 73.0 37.0
Rolling stock repair
facilities 9.1 5.4 14.5 7.3
Telecommunications, power
facilities, buildings and
others 6.6 0.4 7.0 3.6
Total Base Cost 80.9 78.6 159.5 80.9
Physical contingencies 6.5 1.0 7.5 3.8
Price contingencies 17.2 12.4 30.1 15.3
Total 105.1 92.0 197.1 100.0
(US$ million) 216.7 189.7 406.4)
2.04 The main components of the project were as follows:
1. Construction of a new siding for the Chang Weon industrial complex;
2. Electrification of the 8.5 km Seoul-Susaeg section;
3. Increase in line and station capacity, mainly:
(a) double tracking of (i) the 8.6 km Gongjeon-Bongyang section of
the Chung Bug line, (ii) the 9.6 km Yongsan-Susaeg section of
the Yong San line, and (iii) the 13.1 km Seongbug-Euijeongbu
section of the Gyeong Weon ltne.
(b) construction of a by-pass line at Gyeongju, extension of
marshalling yards (2 locations) and station yards (8
locations), extension of existing and construction of new
crossing loops (20 locations), and construction of two new
freight terminals in the Seoul area; and
(c) installation of CTC on about 200 km of lines;
4. Way and structures, mainly:
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(a) rail renewal (260 km), track renewal (70 km), acquisition and
laying of concrete sleepers (150,000), addition of ballast
(320,000 cu m); -
(b) separation of rail and road level at 59 crossings;
(c) right-of-way Improvements; and
(d) construction and equipping of a permanent way workshop,
and acquisition of track maintenance equipment;
5. Motive power and rolling stock, mainly:
(a) acquisition of 30 diesel locomotives, 2 breakdown cranes, 211
passenger cars and 1420 freight cars; and
(b) remodeling of 59 diesel locomotives, 14 railcars, 40 heating
cars, 80 passenger and baggage cars, and improvement of
1000 freight cars;
6. Construction and equipping of a new passenger car workshop at
Daejeon and improvement of existing workshops and sheds;
7. Additional telecommunication installations, power facilities,
buildings and housing facilities; and
8. Provision of:
(a) equipment for KNR-s training facilities, and
(b) technical assistance for feasibility studies, accounting,
and mechanical equipment maintenance.
2.05 The items to be financed by the Bank under Loan 1542-KO were:
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Cost (including
contingencies
US$ million) %
Rails 50 kg/m (33,000 tons) 13.88 11.2
Track material workshop equipment 2.54 2.1
Track maintenance equipment 1.11 0.9
Breakdown cranes (2) 1.62 1.4
Special express passenger cars (45) 16.60 13.R
Linked express passeenger cars (166) 32.87 27.4
Freight cars (1420) 46.08 38.4
Rolling stock workshop equipment 4.58 3.8
Training and technical assistance 0.72 0.6
Total KNR 119.50 99.6
Transport sector studies 0.50 0.4
Total Loan 120.00 100.0
2.06 A condition for loan effectiveness was the increase of RNR's
freight and passenger tariffs to levels acceptable to the Bank. This was
done on June 21, 1978. The loan became effective on August 3, 1978.
2.07 The particular covenants included in the Loan Agreement relate to
(i) KNR's autonomy, (ii) a management study by consultants, (iii) RNR's
financial objectives, (iv) feasibility studies prior to carrying out new
investments, (v) a plan to improve the maintenance and utilization of KNR's
locomotives and rolling stock, and (vi) transport sector studies. Details
are shown in Annex 1.
3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND COST
Project Start-up
3.01 There were no particular start-up problems. For the major
Bank-financed project items bids were invited within 5 weeks after signing
of the Loan Agreement.
Revision of Content of Project
3.02 General. The content of the project was changed substantially
(Tables 3.1 and 3.2), the main changes being:
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(a) the doubling of the whole Chung Bug line (113 km), of which
only an 8.6 km section originally was included in the project
(para. 3.03);
(b' change in the alignment and scope of the Gyeongju by-pass line
(para 3.04);
(c) change in size and at the same time deferment of the Bugog
freight terminal (para 3.05);
(d) additional work on station buildings (para. 3.06);
(e) additional quantities of Bank financed items (para. 3.07);
(f) addition of new items (para. 3.08 and Table 3.2);
(g) deferment of capacity increasing investments, (para. 3.09); and
(h) slowing down the permanent way improvement program (pars. 3.10).
3.03 Chung Bug Line. The question of doubling the Chung Bug line was raised
by KNR and the Goverment before the appraisal of the Sixth Railway Project.
However, the Bank did not agree with the Government on the economic justifi-
cation for the whole work, and only doubling of the section Gongjeon-Bongyang
(8.6 km) at an estimated cost of W 2.6 billion including contingencies) was
included in the project. Nevertheless, the Government, giving the doubling
of the whole Chung Bug line high priority for political and military reasons,
decided to go ahead with the construction and works were started along the
whole line in early 1979. After exchange of views with the Governeant and
MNR, the Bank suggested in a letter of September 4, 1979 that these works
should not be considered part of KNR-s investment plan and be executed with-
out placing an extra financial burden on INR. In a letter of February 4,
1980, the Government agreed to compensate KNR for its expenditures for the
works not included in the Sixth Railway Project. This solution was not fully
satisfactory as KNR had to bear maintenance and operating costs of an
uneconomic and underutilized investment. This situation is expected to be
somewhat alleviated when KXR vill utilize the Chung-Bug line for transporting
to the cement plants in the Jecheon area coal imported through the new
Incheon port coal terminal and the Su-In line to be widened under the Coal
and Cement Distribution Project (Loan 2267-KO signed April 29, 1983).
The works were completed in October 1980 at a total cost of U 67.6 billion.
3.04 Gyeongju By-Pass Line. At the time of appraisal only preliminary
engineering was done and on the basis thereof a 3.5 km by-pass line at a
cost of US$1.1 million (including contingencies) was eavisaged. During
final engineering the project was changed to include a 5.9 km line and two
additional station yards. The total cost is now estimated at U 8.0 billion.
The works which started in April L979, are ongoing and expected to be
completed only in 1984.
3.05 Bugog Freight Terminal. The project included a general cargo
terminal at an estimated cost of W 2.2 billion including contingencies,, In
early 1979 KNR suggested a substantial increase in the size of the toroinal.
After further analysis and discussions with KNR the Bank in November'1979
recommended to defer finalizing the plans for the terminal until tbe results
of a then ongoing coal-and cement distribution study were availab(e. MM
accepted this recommendation and the plans were deferred. Agreeient on the
final design has later been reached with the Bank and a new c'plex,
including separate terminals for coal;- cement, containers angeneral cargo
is included in the Coal and Cement Distribution Project. Se terminal,
which is estimated to cost about U 79.8 billion, is under construction and
expected to be completed by 1986. The costs shown under he Sixth Railway
Project (W 8.0 billion) are mainly for land acquisitioand earthworks
carried out in 1979-80. /
3.06 Statioa Buildings. The project included • nor works (total cost
below W 0.2 billion ) at 30 stations. During theAproject perigd works
were carried out at only 15 stations, but at a c!st of W$2.S million of
which about US$1.0 million to rebuild the Ir station, which was badly
damaged in an explosion and fire accident, a about W 1.3 billion at five
other stations to meet traffic demand.
3.07 Additional Quantities of Bank- 4nanced Items. Considering the
savings in cost on Bank financed items para. 3.29 and 3.30) and the urgent
need for passenger cars and track mai enance equipment, the Bank agreed
to finance additional quantities as ollows:
(a) in December 1978, 35 passenger cars at a cost of about US$8.4 mil-
lion;
(b) in January 1980, s re parts for passenger cars at a cost of
US$0.7 million; d
(c) in June and N ember 1980, track maintenance equipment at a cost
of about US$.6 million.
In November 1981 t Bank agreed to KNR using then remaining uncommitted
funds, about US$0.7 million for employing lo 4onsultants for conducting
detailed engineefing for the widening of the gauge of0 he Sr-In line
(para. 3.25)./ C
3.08 /Y w !tems. As shown in Table 3.2(7KUR n 1978 8 carried out items
aot inclu ed in the project at a cost of t kut U n 24. billion. The
main it s were:
/a) T=provement of stations in the9Seo are for electric operation
at a cost of W 9.0 billion. CXDhe rks, ich mainly consisted of
- 8a-
The works which started in April 1979, are ongoing and expected to be
completed only in 1984.
3.05 Bugog Freight Terminal. The project included a general cargo
terminal at an estimated cost of W 2.2 billion including contingencies. In
early 1979 XUR suggested a substantial Increase in the size of the terminal.
After further analysis and discussions with RNR the Bank in November 1979
recommended to defer finalizing the plans for the terminal until the results
of a then ongoing coal-and cement distribution study were available. NRK
accepted this recommendation and the plans were deferred. Agreement on the
final design has later been reached with the Bank and a new complex,
including separate terminals for coal; cement, containers and general cargo
is included in the Coal and Cement Distribution Project. The terminal,
which is estimated to cost about U 79.8 billion, is under construction and
expected to be completed by 1986. The costs shown under the Sixth Railway
Project (U 8.0 billion) are mainly for land acquisition and earthworks
carried out in 1979-80.
3.06 Station Buildings. The project included minor works (total cost
below W 0.2 billion ) at 30 stations. During the project peri9d works
were carried aot at only 15 stations, but at a cost of W$2.5 mLllion of
which about USS1.0 million to rebuild the Iri station, which was badly
damaged in an explosion and fire accident, and about W 1.3 billion at five
other stations to meet traffic demand.
3.07 Additional Quantities of Bank-Financed Items. Considering the
savings in cost on Bank financed items (para. 3.29 and 3.30) and the urgent
need for passenger cars and track maintenance equipnent, the Bank agreed
to finance additional quantities as follows:
(a) in December 1978, 35 passenger cars at a cost of about US$8.4 mil-
lion;
(b) in January 1980, spare parts for passenger cars at a cost of
US$0.7 million; and
(c) in June and November 1980, t.ack maintenance equipment at a cost
of about US$0.6 million.
In November 1981 the Bank agreed to MNR using the then remaining uncozzitted
funds, about US$0.7 million for employing local consultants-for conducting
detailed engineering for the widening of the gauge of the Su-In line
(para. 3.25).
3.D8 Xew Items. As shown in Table 3.2, NRK in 1978-80 carried out items
not included in the project at a cost of about Won 24.6 billion. The
rain items were:
(a) Improvement of stations in the Seoul area for electric operation
at a cost of W 9.0 billion. The works, which mainly consisted of
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new platforms, stairs and modifications of buildings, vere needed
for the increasing urban passenger traffic;
(b) thirty-seven electric railcars at a cost of W 10.9 billion,
needed to meet the urban traffic demand, and agreed to by the
Bank in September 1979; and
(c) A new statiou in Jeonju, at a cost of W 3.0 billion, which was
needed for the city development and financed by the Government.
3.09 Deferment of Capacity Increasing Investments. Dae mainly to lower
freight traffic than forecast (paras. 4.0] and 4.02) and scarcity of local
funds, capacity increasing investments, at a total estimated cost of about W
29.6 billion were deferred to 1981 or later. The major deferred items were:
Appraisal cost estimate
(inc-l. contingencies)
W billion
Electrification Seoul-Susaeg (8.6 km) 2.2
Double track Yongsan-Susaeg (9.6 km) 5.0
Double track Seongbug-Euijeonbu (13.1 km) 6.0
Marshalling yard extensions (2 places) 3.1
CTC installation (about 200 km) 10.3
Miscellaneous items 2.0
Total 29.6
3.10 Track Renewal Program. Mainly because of scarcity of local funds
-IUR decided to slow down its permanent way improvement program. The main
project works deferred to 1980 and later were:
Appraisal cost estimate
(incl. contingencies)
W billion
Track renewal (50 km) 2.9
Concrete sleepers (60,000) 1.2
Ballast (286,000 cu m) 1.5
Separation of rail and road at
level crossings (36 places) 6.3
Right-of-way improvements 1.8
Total 13.7
- 10 -
Project Implementation Schedule
3.11 Except for (i) the items which are deferred to 1982 or later
(paras. 3.09 and 3.10) and (ii) the new Daejeon passenger car workshop
which, mainly due to delays in engineering but also to slow progress in
construction works is delaved almost two years, the project as defined at
appraisal, was completed by the original completion date, December 31, 1981
(Table 3.1). For two items, the Chang Weon siding and the Gyeongju by-pass
line (para. 3.04), which were substantially increased in scope, some works
were carried over to 1982 and later.
Procurement
3.12 General. The estimated and actual procurement schedules for Bank-
financed items are shown in Table 3.3. The analysis of the time for the
different procurement steps is given in Table 3.4, and the result (for
original project items only) is summarized below.
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Time (days)
Appraisal estimate Actual
Max Min Aver. Max Min Aver.
Delay in preparation of bid
documents (time from appraisal
estimate of date for Bank
agreement on tender documents
to actual date) - - - 278 32 71
Completion of bid documents (time
from Bank's agremeement on bid
documents to bid invitation) 17 14 16 197 5 36
Bid submission (time from bid
invitation to bid opening) 103 61 77 83 50 67
Bid evaluation (time from bid
opening to submission of evaluation
to the Bank) 16 15 15 140 33 117
Bank review of the bid evaluation
(time from submission of evaluation
to the Bank to Bank's agreement to
award) 15 15 15 15 3 9
Award of contract (time fron Bank's
agreement to award to signing of
contract) 17 16 17 17 1 6
Total bidding procedure (time from
Bank's agreement on bid documents
to award of contract) 167 122 140 448 155 237
Delivery (time from signing of
contract to completion of delivery) 608 334 468 799 281 409
Total procurement (time from Bank's
agreement on bid documents to
completion of delivery) 747 457 609 1,024 461 645
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3.13 Preparation of bid documents The appraisal assumption that the
Bank's agreement to all bid documents except rolling stock workshop
equipment which was scheduled later, would come in March 1978 was very
optimistic, considering that the SAR was issued only on March 15 and the
Loan presented to the Board on March 31. KNR submitted most of the draft
specifications to the Bank during negotiations in February 1978 and the
Bank commented on them on March 7, 1978. However, the revision of the
documents and the Bank's final review and agreement took another 1-2 months.
Nevertheless, bid invitations for all items, except rolling stock workshop
equipment (see above) and permanent way workshop machinery, the procurement
of which was deferred by more than one year to match the timing of the
construction of the workshop, was done by mid-May, within five weeks after
the signing of the Loan Agreement.
3.14 Bid evaluation. The appraisal procurement schedule provided for
one month for the Borroweer's bid evaluation. Considering the two-step
procedures used in Korea (opening and evaluation first of the technical
proposal and only thereafte: of the priced bids) and the involvement of two
agencies; INR and the Central Office of Supply (OSROK), this time is adequate
only for exceptionally simple cases. For most of the items the bid
evaluation took about 4.5 months, of which about 3 months for the review of
the technical proposals, which in the case of the passenger and freight cars
and the rolling stock workshop equipment was delayed because of complaints
from bidders.
3.15 Bank review of bids. The Bank's review of the Borrower's bid
evaluation took only 3 to 15 days, which is the same or better than the
appraisal estimate.
3.16 Award of contract. The time from the Bank's agareement to award
of contract to the signing of contract was average only 6 days or much
shorter than the appraisal estiamte.
3.17 Total time for bidding. The actual time from the Bank's agreement
on bid documents to the award of contract varied from about 5 to 14 months
(average 8 months) as compared to the appraisal estimate of 4 to 5.5 months
(average 4.7 months). The difference is mainly related to the bid
evaluation (para. 3.14).
3.18 Delivery. The actual average delivery period uas about 13.5 months,
or about 2 months shorter than the appraisal estimate. For limited express
passenger cars, a substantial delivery delay occurred (para. 3.22), increas-
ing the delivery period for this item to near 27 months. For all other
items, the actual average delivery time was only about 12 months, or about
3.5 months shorter than the appraisal estimate.
3.19 Total procurement time. The actual average total procurement time
(from Bank's agreement on bid documents to completion of delivery) for all
Bank-financed items originally included in the project was about 21.5 months
as compared to the appraisal estimate of about 20 months. The delivery of
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all these items was completed by early January 1981, as scheduled at
appraisal and about 18 months before the original Closing Date. The addi-
tional items (para. 3.07) were delivered by September 1981, except for one
item, the track meas4ring car (para. 3.23), which vas delayed beyond the
original Closing Date.
3.20 Passenger Cars. The procurement of passenger cars (total cost
about USs57.3 million) involved some problems and is, therefore, described
in detail below. Bids for 45 special express and 166 limited express
passenger cars were invited on May 16, 1978. Four bids were received and
the technical proposals yere opened on August 1, 1978. After review by KNR
and OSROK one bid was rejected as non-responsive to the specifications. Two
proposals (from Ssangyong Corporation, Korea and Tang Eng Iron Works,
Taiwan) were accepted while the fourth bidder, Hyundai Heavy Industries,
Korea, which at the time was (and still is) one of Korea-s leading
manufacturers of heavy equipment (ships, diesel engines, cars etc.), was not
considered qualified because of -absence of manufacturing and supplying
records of the offered products." After complaints b-? Hyundai and
further investigations, the Bank, recognizing Eyundai s experience and
capability as a manufacturer of heavy equipment,-on September 22, 1978,
recommended OSROK to judge Hyundai's capability -from the plant and
machinery they possess and the experience they have in the manufacture of
industrial equipment which includes similar operations- (to manufacturing
railway rolling stock). After further review KNR, however, maintained its
earlier position, whereafter the Bank, considering that this was a case
where (i) the capability of a Korean manufacturer was judged by Korean
authorities, and (ii) there was no reason for doubts about the integrity of
the judgment, on October 16 agreed to the proposed disqualification of
Hyundai. Accordingly, OSROK decided to reject Hyundai's bid and the
remaining two price proposals were opened on November 2.
3.21 For special express cars (45) only one bid (by Ssangyong) was
submitted and later accepted. For limited express power source cars (14)
Ssangyong submitted the lowest evaluated bid, while for limited express
coaches (152) Tang Eng was the lowest bidder as shown below:
Bidder Price Delivery period
(USS) (months)
Ssangyong, Korea 31,536,135 12
Tang sng, Taiwan 22,860,952 18
KNR and OSROK, who apparently wanted a contract with Ssangyong, expressed at
this stage doubts about Tang Eng-s capability to carry out a possible
contract, however, the Bank, after further investigations, stated that it
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would have no objection on technical basis to giving Tang Eng the contract.
KNR then strongly emphasized the need for delivery within one year from
contract, and OSROK, therefore, on December 18, recommended as its main
alternative to award contract to Tang Eng only for the quantities (80 cars)
this firm could deliver within one year, while the contract for remaining
cars (72) would be awarded to Ssangyong. However, in case this proposal
could not be accepted by the Bank, OSROK alternatively proposed award to
Tang Eng of contract for all 152 cars. On December 21 the Bank agreed to
the alternative proposal, and contract with Tang Eng was signed the
following day.
3.22 According to the contract with Tang Eng the delivery of 152 cars
would be completed by June 1980, however, due to internal problems within
the manufacturing firm, the delivery was completed only by end-Janaury 1981.
Although limited express passenger traffic in 1980 was 26% above the
appraisal estimate, it was lower than the 1979 traffic. The pressure to
place new cars in service had therefore abated and the delay did not cause
any problems.
3.23 Track measuring car. The procurement of a track measuring car,
the financing of which was agreed to by the Bank in June 1981 (para. 3.07),
involved complications, which delayed the delivery and caused a deferment
of the Closing Date (para. 3.31). Bids were invited on September 25, and the
technical proposals of the two bids received were opened on December 2,
1980. At the time of the opening of the priced bids, in early March 1981
one of the competitors, an Austrian firm informed the Bank that the other
competitor, (a Swiss firi-)had offered a machine which was not new as
required by the specifications. The result of further comprehensive
investigations by OSROK was that the Swiss firm could not show that the
machine offered was new. OSROK therefore decided to invite new bids, which
were opened on August 7 (technical proposals) and September 3 (price
quotations). On September 28 the Bank agreed to award a contract as
proposed by OSROK. The contract was signed on October 2, 1Q81, for delivery
within 12 months, however the machine was actually delivered only in
December 1982.
Technical Assistance
3.24 The main part of the technical assistance included in the project was
for economic feasibility studies of major investments planned by KNR for the
years 1980 and 1981 and proposed for inclusion in the Seventh Railway Project.
Three of five invited Korean firms submitted proposals in August 1978. A Korean
consulting firm assisted by a U.S. firm was selected to carry out the study, vhich
started on February 9, 1979. The draft final report, which was issued in August
1979, was not acceptable to the Bank, and the consultants were requested to do a
substantial revision of the report. This revision took very long time and the
final report, which was of mediocre quality, was issued only in July 1980, close
to two months after the signing of the Loan Agreement for the Seventh Railway
Project. Thus, the study was of rather limited value for the preparation of that
project.
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3.25 During the preparation of the Coal and Cement Distribution Project
the feasibility of widening the narrow-gauge Su-In line was studied, and as a
result a decision was taken to include the works in that project. The final
engineering study, which was completed in February 1982, was partly financed
from Loan 1542-KO (para. 3.07). The widening of Su-In line will be carried
out as part of the Coal and Cement Distribution Project (Loan 2267-KO).
Project Cost
3.26 General. A comparison of the appraisal estimate of price
escalation with the actual cost development in Korea during the period
1976-1982 is shown in the following table:
End Mid Mid Mid Mid Mid Mid
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Local Currency Items
Appraisal estimate 100 104.0 112.3 121.0 129.8 138.9 148.2
Actual/a 100 104.4 116.6 138.4 192.3 235.5 247.6
Index (appr. est. = 100) 100 100.4 103.8 114.4 148.1 169.5 167.1
Foreign Currency Items
Appraisal estimates 100 104.0 111.8 119.3 126.8 134.4 142.4
Actual /a 100 104.4 116.6 138.4 192.3 235.5 247.6
Index Cappr. est. = 100) 100 100.4 104.3 116.0 151.7 175.2 173.8
/a Based on wholesale price index in Yorea (for mid-1982 estimated). This
is a reasonable approximation also for foreign currency items consider-
ing that Ci) a large portion of these items were procured in Korea, and
(ii) for imported items (mainly from Japan, Taiwan and USA) the devalu-
ation of Won must be taken into account.
3.27 The actual project cost as reported by KNR, compared with appraisal
estimates are shown in Table 3.5 and summarized below.
Total
Cost (W billion) cost
Local Foreign Total index
Appraisal estimate 105.1 92.0 197.1 in0
Actual cost:
Total project 156.9 81.0 237.9 121
Non-project items (para. 3.08) 24.5 0.1 24.6 12
Total expenditures 181.4 81.1 262.5 133
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3.28 The cost overrun of 21Z (or 33Z if also non-project items are
counted) is analysed in Table 3.6. The analysis shows that only about 70% of
the original project quantities were executed while about 30% were
deferred. Jn the other hand, additional quantities of project items
correspondiug to 33% of the original project were carried out (of which 24%
for the doubling of the Chung Bug line, (para 3.03). Thus, the total
project quantities executed were slightly higher than the appraisal estimate
(3%). This indicates an average price increase of 17% above the appraisal
estimate, which is in line with the actual overall inflation in Korea over
the execution period (para. 3.26).
3.29 Bank-Financed Items. The actual utilization of the loan is
summarized in the following table:
Cost USS million
Appr. estimate Index
and contingen- (appr-
cies Actual est - 100)
Original It'ms
Rails, 5L kg/m (33,000 t) 13.88 12.99 94
Track maintenance workshop equipment 2.54 2.51 99
Track maintenance equipment 1.11 1.23 111
Breakdown cranes (2) 1.62 1.11 69
Special express passenger cars (45) 16.60 14.33 86
Limited express passenger cars (166) 32.87 28.76 87
Freight cars (1,420) 46.08 44.38 96
Rolling stock workshop equipment 4.58 3.45 75
Training and technical assistance 0.72 0.40 56
Total KNR 119.50 109.16 91
Transport sector studies 0.50 0.42 84
Total Loan 120.00 109.58 91
Additional Items Agreed with the Bank
Limited express passenger cars (35) - 8.36
Spare parts for passenger cars - 0.74
Track maintenance equipment - 0.62
Engineering study of the SUr-in line - 0.70
Total Additional Items - 10.42
Total Loau 120.00 120.00 100
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3.30 As shown in para. 3.29 the actual cost of the original Bank-financed
items was only 91% of the appraisal estimate, leaving an amount of about
US$10.4 million for additional quantities of passenger cars, track main-
tenance equipment and technical assistance (para. 3.07).
Disbursements
3.31 Disbursements under the loan are shown in the graph, Annex 2. As
shown in paras. 3.12 -3.19 there were some delays in the procurement of the
Bank financed items which lead to about nine months delay in the start of
disbursements. However, by the beginning of 1980 the delay was reduced to
about two months and the disbursement for all original items was completed
ahead of schedule. The delay in procurement of an additional item (para.
3.23) caused the 21 months delay in completion of disbursements and the
deferment of the Closing Date of the loan.
4. TRAFFIC AND OPERATIONS
Freight Traffic
4.01 Freight traffic statistics for the period 1967 to 1982 are given
in T4ble 4.1 and graph, Annex 3, which illustrate the history of traffic
forecasts for the KNR from the Bank's Second to Seventh Railway Projects.
The fourth project appraisal is the only one which underestimated the growth
of freight traffic, and only by a small margin by 1976. The third, fifth,
sixth and seventn project appraisal grossly overestimated traffic growth.
By 1981 the forecast done for the sixth project exceeded the actual traffic
by as much as 29%. For the period 1976-1979, an annual growth of 8.3% was
projected while the actual growth was only 4.4%. In 1980 and 1981 the
situation was even worse with a slight decline (about 1%) in total freight
traffic, due to the general decline in Korea's economy. The growth was
lower than expected for all commodities, and in particular for coal. The
planned target for coal production of 24 mt by 1981 was not reached.
Actually production stagnated around 18 mt until 1981 when it exceeded 19 mt
for the first time. The risk of not achieving the target had been recognized
at the time of the appraisal (para. 2.20 of the SAR). Cement traffic was
also lower because of the stagnation in construction. Domestic demand for
cement in 1980 and 1981 amounted to only 56 and 53% of installed capacity
versus 92% in 1978.
Passenger Traffic
4.02 Intercity Traffic. As shown in Table 4.2 and graph, Annex 4 both
the fourth and the fifth project appraisals underestimated the growth of
intercity passenger traffic. In both cases the forecast was about 10% below
actual traffic by the end of the forecast period. For the sixth project,
- 18 -
actual traffic exceeded forecast up to 1980, (+11% in 1979 and +8% in 1980);
however, in 1981, traffic dropped 4% from its 1980 level and as a result the
actual traffic came very close to the forecast. For the seventh project,
which assumed continuation of the very high growth, reached between 1976 and
1978, forecasts turned out to be extremely overestimated due to the
difficult economic situation since 1979.
4.03 Seoul Urban Traffic. KNR's Seoul urban railway traffic (Table 4.3
and graph, Annex 5), which started in 1974 grew at an annual rate of about
22% from 1976 to 1981 as compared with a forecast of 13% in the sixth
project appraisal. By 1981 the forecast was only 69% of the actual traffic.
The forecast for the seventh project, which assumed a continuation of the
steep growth up to 1979 also turned out to be too optimistic. As for other
traffic, the economic decline in 1980-81 also affected the Seoul urban
railway traffic, which from 1979 to 1982 grew only by about 6.5% annually as
compared with the forecast growth of about 25%. The high growth forecast
had been postulated in parts on the opening of new lines which was postponed
due to the economic stituation.
Operations
4.04 Selected operating statistics for 1977-82 are given in Table 4.4.
In general, operational efficiency is very high. Availability of motive
power and rolling stock increased over the period while utilization of
rolling stock and productivity in general increased up to 1979-80, but
declined thereafter due to declining traffic.
4.05 A comparision of forecast and actual operational performance
indicators is shown in Table 4.5. For availability and average freight car
load, the forecasts were achieved or exceeded. The utilization of limited
express passenger cars was much better than forecast up to 1979 but declined
with declining traffic in 1980-81. For the utilization of locomotives
and special express passenger cars the appraisal forecast turned out to be
too high. Turnaround for gondola cars has improved to a level close to
forecast in 1981, while for other types of freight cars turnaround has
declined to levels far below forecast, mainly due to declining traffic.
I
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5. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF THE BORROWER
BACKGROUND AND CONCLUSIONS
5.01 KNR's financial objective is to generate from its gross operating
revenues funds sufficient to cover working costs, debt service requirements
and finance a reasonable proportion of its capital expenditure without undue
financial assistance from the Government. To this effect it was agreed
during loan negotiations that the Borrower and KNR would take all measures
necessary to allow XNR to earn gross operating revenues sufficient to cover
the aggregate of (a) working costs; (b) depreciation provisions based on
fixed assets revalued annually; and (c) rates of return on average fixed
assets in use of not less than 2Z in 1979, 3.2% in 1980 and 4% thereafter
(Loan Agreement Section 4.04). KNR's actual gross operating revenue during
project implementation (1977-82) covered each year items (a) and (b) but was
not enough to earn the anticipated rate of return. The present analysis:
(a) looks into reasons for KNR's failure to meet its rate of return targets;
(b) assesses the impact of this failure on KNR's financial situation and (c)
reports on remedial action taken in subsequent projects.
5.02 The analysis is backed by Tables 5.1-5.3 which show appraisal
projections and actuals of KNR's income statements, sources and applications
of funds and balance sheets for 1977-82 and Tables 5.4(a) to (e) which show
actual total and unit operating revenues, operating costs and net operating
revenues broken down into types of passenger trains and main freight commodi-
ties over 1977-81. Tables 5.1-5.3 are summarized in the Table on page 20.
5.03 The main conclusions to be drawn from the analysis are (a) that
the very low tarrif applied to ordinary passenger trains was the major
reason behind KNR-s failure to meet the project's financial objectives, and
(b) that KNR would have been close to meeting its 1981 rate of return
objective despite this inadequate rating, if the growth of the very profi-
table express train traffic, all of which exceeded appraisal forecasts
(para. 5.04) had not significantly slowed down since late 1979 as a result
of the difficult economic situation affecting Korea as well as the rest of
the world (para. 5.06-5.09). The latter finding is a substantial and
encouraging departure from the past when KNR's failure to meet its finencial
objectives was only due to the inadequacy of its tariffs.
Income Statements
Traffic
5.04 Actual passenger traffic exceeded appraisal forecasts by 16% in
1979. However, this excess decreased to 10% in 1980 and 8% in 1981 as overall
passenger traffic stagnated at its 1979 level. KNR-s freight traffic perfor-
mance reached 96% of appraisal forecast in 1978, but only 83% in 1980 and 77%
in 1981. The actual share of freight traffic decreased from 38% of total
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traffic quoted in traffic units (1 pass-km equivalent to 1 ton-km) in 1977 to
33% in 1981, while the share of passenger traffic rose from 62% to 67%.
Appraisal projections were 39Z for freight and 61% for passenger in 1977 and
41% for freight and 59% for passenger in 1981. This shift in traffic trend
adversely affected KNR-s earnings as passenger traffic historically generated
a profit while freight traffic, principally coal and cement, suffered heavy
losses due to inadequate tariffs.
Tariffs
5.05 Table 5.1 shows that KNR-s actual gross operating revenues were
substantially higher than projected at appraisal mainly because traffic and
tarrif increases were higher than anticipated. The following table shows
that, over 1977-81, passenger tariff increases slightly exceeded inflation
every year except in 1980, and that by December 1981 they had been increased
6% more than the CPI over the 4-1J2 year project petliod. Freight tariff
increases were below inflation through mid 1980 but exceeded it substantially
for the rest of the period. As a result freight tariffs were increased about
10% more than inflation over the same 4-1/2 years. C.,al tariffs which were
historically lower than others were increased by 902 between mid-1980 and the
end of 1981.
Tariff indices
Dates
CPI of increases Passenger Freight
Mid-1977 100 Jan 1977 100 100
Mid-1978 115 Jun 1978 119 115
Mid-1979 135 May 1979 137 127
Mid-1980 175 Jan 1980 164 152
Mid-1981 215 Jun 1981 224 232
Dec 1981 222 Dec 1S81 235 259
However, these increases were generally applied across the board. As a result
some rates were still far short from covering costs. The most striking case
relates to ordinary passenger trains, tariffs of which were even short of
covering variable costs (Tables 5.4(a) to (e).
Net Operating Revenue Generated by Passenger Traffic
5.06 The table in para 5.05 shows that until 1979 passenger tariffs grew
faster than inflation. As a result the net operating revenue generated by
this traffic increased from W 3.6 billion in 1977 to W 18.1 billion in 1979.
During this period the rapid growth of the very profitable express trains'
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traffic generated enough profits to more than offset losses on ordinary
trains, for which tariffs did not even cover variable costs (Table 5.4 (a) to
(e)). However, express train traffic growth slowed down in 1980-81 in line
with the difficult economic situation of the country. As a result the net
operating profit from passengers decreased rapidly to W 16.1 billion in 1980
and W 2.2 billion in 1981. The table in page 23 shows that these revenues
would have been Won 18.5 billion higher in 1980 and W 60.5 billion in 1981 if
e:-press train traffic had continued growing at the same rate as between 1976
and 1979 (about 17% p.a.). The main explanation behind these potential addi-
tional profits is that the additional traffic would have been transported at
variable operating cost only, as passenger fixed costs were covered by actual
traffic (tables 5.4(d) and (e).
5.07 The Government has systematically kept ordinary train tariffs low
based on the understanding that they are mainly used by the poorest layer of
the country's population. As this was a major reason behind KNR's failure to
meet its financial objectives, the Government agreed to conduct a survey of
ridership on ordinary trains in order to determine the occupancy factor and
the optional fare ro be applied to these trains' users, based on their income.
Upon completion oi che survey the Government, KNR and the Bank will agree on
(a) possible reductions in the number of ordinary trains in operatioin;
(b) tariffs; and (c) subsidies to be provided by the Government to make up
for losses on ordinary trains and commuter traffic. A 50% increase in ordi-
nary train tariffs applied in 1980 (considered to be a reasonable assumption)
would have generated additional revenues of W 12.9 billion in 1980 and W 3.3
billion in 1981.
Net Operating Losses generated by Freight Traffic
5.08 Freight tariffs in general, in particular for coal and cement,
which represent together about 60% of KNR's freight traffic, were historically
much below costs. The table in para. 5.05 shows that freight tariffs were
increased more than inflation over the project implementation period. This
explains why net operating losses incurred from freight traffic which
increased from W 1.4 billion in 1977 to W 19.9 billion in 1980, were reduced
to Won 11.2 billion in 1981. Given MNR's high productivity there was little
room for reducing operating costs. Even larger tariff increases would
consequently have been needed to offset losses. However, their imple-
mentation would have been politically difficult in a period of very high
inflation, and in some cases would even have adversely affected KNR's
competitiveness.
Traffic ln pass-km mln Gross operating Varlable operating Additional net
Estimate Actual UDfference revenues cost operating revenues
/a Won/pass-km Won/pass-km Won/pass-km Total (Won bin)
1980
Special Express 975 797 178 22.70 7.95 14.75 2.6
Llmlted Express
Alr conditLoned 1,560 727 833 15.05 5.23 9.82 8.2
Non-air conditioned 9,000 7,739 1,261 9.40 3.31 6.09 7.7
Total 11,535 9,263 2,272 18.5
1981
Special Express 1,120 722 398 29.30 11.52 5.6
LLmited Express
Air conditioned 2,500 2,0O40 460 16.14 5.93 12.1
Non-air condltioned 9,900 6,793 3,107 11.09 4.79 42.8
Total 13,520 9,555 3,965 60.5
/a Assuming a 17X p.a. traffic growth.
- 24 -
Overall Wet Revenue and Net Profit (loss)
5.09 The following table shows (a) a breakdown of KNR-s total net
operating revenue; (b) net non-operating revenue; (c) total net revenues; (d)
interest charges; and (e) net profit (loss) oaver 1977-81. Details are in
Tables 5.1 and 5.4 (a) to (e).
Net Operating Revenue (loss)
Passengers Net non-
Ordinary Sun- operating Interest Net
Total Trains Freight dries Total revenue charges profit
(loss) (loss)
1977 3.6 (12.5) (5.4) (0.5) (2.3) (1.4) 16.3 (20.0)
1978 12.3 (18.3) (8.0) (1.5) 2.8 (1.3) 23.8 (22.3)
1979 18.1 (25.4) (17.5) (0.8) (0.2) 5.0 29.7 (24.9)
1980 16.1 (33.7) (19.9) 2.7 (1.1) 4.2 48.6 (45.5)
1t981 2.2 (47.9) (11.2) 3.8 (5.2) 2.4 60.1 (62.9)
Thanks to the above mentioned tariff increases, MUR was close to covering
operating costs every year although the latter exceeded appraisal estimates by
5% inu19 7 8, 19% in 1979, 46% in 1980 and 69% in 1981. However, it did not
generate revenues enough to finance interest charge on loans contracted for
financing project investments. Its annual net deficit grew in line with
interest charges.
5.10 The following table gives net operating revenues (losses), rates of
return and net revenues (losses) assuming that KNR would have been able to
earn in 1980 and 1981 the additional revenues it could have generated from
(a) increased ordinary train tariffs (para. 5.07); (b) continued growth in
express trains traffic (para. 5.06) and (c) simultaneous materialization of
assumptions (a) and (b).
(a) (b) (c)
Options 1980 1981 1980 1981 1980 1981
Net operating revenue 11.8 8.1 17.4 55.3 30.3 68.6
(loss) W billion
Rate of return: % 1 0.5 1.4 3.6 2.4 4.5
Net revenue (loss)
W billion (32.6) (29.6) (27.0) (2.4) (14.1) 10.9
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Loan Agreement rate of return objectives were 3.2% for 1980 and 4Z for 1981.
KR would have improved its financial performance if it had achieved optiron
(a) approached the Loan Agreement objective in 1981 if it had achieved
option (b) and approached the Loan Agreement objective for 1980 and
surpassed this objective for 1981 if it had achieved option (c). KNR-s
failure to meet the financial objectives of the project should consequently
be blamed primarily on the inadequacy of ordinary train tariffs but also
on the 1979-82 worldwide economic recession.
Sources and Applications of Funds
5.11 KNR-s cumulated sources and applications of funds in 1977-81 are
as follows. Details are in Table 5.2.
Sources (W bil) Applications (W bil)
Cash generated from operations 134.5 Investments 556.9
Increase in provision for
severance pay 8.7 Debt Service
'Governtment subsidies against Interest 178.4
operating losses 79.9 Repayments 124.8
Government contribution toward
investments 84.3 Total 303.2
Borrowing 431.9
Sales of assets 28.8 Total Applications 860.1
Total Sources 768.1 Decrease in Working
capital (92.0)
Total 768.1
Financing of Debt Service -
5.12 To finance its debt service of W 303.2 billion, KNR used the
following sources:
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(V bil)
Cash generated from operations 134.5
Increase in severance pay 8.7
Subsidy against operating losses 79.9
Sales of assets 28.8
Subtotal 251.9
Gap (financed through borrowing from
Korean Development Bank) 51.3
Total 303.2
Financing of Investments
5.13 To finance its capital investments amounting to W 556.9 billion
K=NR used the following sources:
(W bil)
Government contributions 84.3
Borrowing 380.6
Subtotal financing 464.9
Financing gap 92.0
Total 556.9
To finance this gap IMR had to progressively deplete its working capital which
became negative starting in 1980, i.e., short-term liabilities exceeded
current assets.
Balance Sheet
Short-Term Situtation
5.14 Table 5.3 shows that KNR*s working capital deteriorated from a
positive U 8.9 billion position at the start of the Project to a negative
w 90.6 billion by its completion as a result of the above explained shortage
in resources for debt service and investment financing. To cover the
worsening deficit in working capital RIR had to increase its long-term
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borrowing from local sources, which led to heavier interest charges at a
time when KNR's gross operating revenue barely covered operating costs. KNR
was consequently unable to achieve the 1.5 ratio of current costs to current
liabilities provided for under Section 4.04(c) of the Loan Agreement.
Long-Term Situation
5.15 This additional borrowing explains the progressive deterioration
of KNR-s long debt to equity ratio which fell from 29/71 at the start of
the project in 1977 to 38/62 by the end of 1981. This ratio is expected to
further deteriorate due to the additional long-term debt KNR incurred
to finance the investment component of the Seventh Railway Project. To
cover the related debt service KNR will have to generate substantial
funds. As its operating costs cannot be significantly reduced the only way
to generate these funds is to increase gross operating revenues, which
requires that all tariffs fully cover costs.
Remedial Action Taken
5.16 To prevent KNR's future financial performance from being hampered
by inadequate tariff policies due to the Government-s social or economic
considerations the Government and the Bank agreed at negotiations of the
Seventh Railway Project that the Government would establish not later than
December 31, 1984 a revised KNR tariff structure of KNR which would (a)
provide KNR with revenues sufficient to cover all operating costs plus the
agreed rate of return on average net fixed assets in use; and (b) ensure
that no single tariff would be lower than the <NR-s variable cost unless the
'Government subsidizes the difference between the latter cost and the tariff
(Loan 1836-KO Section 4.04 and 4.08 and side letter dated May 21, 1980).
5.17 A comparison between Tables 5.4 (d) and (e) shows that thanks
to the above mentioned tariff increases net operating losses incurred by
KNR on coal and cement transports were reduced from W 2.96/ton-km and
0.40 /ton km respectively in 1980 to W 0.78 and 0.17 in 1981. Calculations
prepared during appraisal of the Coal and Cement Distributions project
showed that KNR-s tariffs as of December 31, 1982 covered 118% and 113% of
coal and cement operating costs but where short 2% for coal and 5% for
cement to cover full cost including debt service requirements. At
negotiations of this project it was agreed that the full cost coverage will
be reached by July 1, 1984 for coal and by January 1, 1985 for cement and
will be maintained thereafter.
5.18 During the above mentioned negotiations it was also agreed that
the Government would:
(a) adjust K'ivR's original 1982-86 investment plan to fit
the reduction in traffic demand caused by the 1980-82
economic recession; and
(b) ease the debt service obligations of KNR through subsidies.
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6. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT
6.01 KNR's operating productivity is one of the highest in the world,
mainly as a result of the action of its highly competent technical management.
However, its financial results do not fully reflect this efficiency. This is
mainly because KNR's present status as a semi-autonomous agency prevents its
management from enjoying the freedom in planning, organizational and financial
decision-making needed for facing increasingly fierce competition and adapting
to abrupt changes in traffic demand and or economic conditions.
6.02 The government was aware of these deficiencies and therefore agreed
to carry out a comprehensive management study under terms of reference agreed
with the Bank. This study, which was financed under Loan 1101-KO (Fifth
Railway Project), was completed in September 1979. At negotiations of the
Sixth Railway Project agreement was reached to implement the study's recommen-
dations in agreement with the Bank (Loan Agreement, Section 3.08).
6.03 The study-s main conclusion was that KNR should be gradually
transformed into a public corporation in which managerial functions would be
delegated, under the guidance of a Board of Directors and the control of the
Administrator (renamed President), to three line managers (renamed Executive
Vice Presidents) in charge of Planning, Coordination and Control; Operations;
and Administration, respectively. The attached chart 20995 shows KNR-s
recommended organization. This transformation would be preceded by a set of
short and medium-term measures focussing on: (a) the establishment of a
management information system and an aggressive marketing organization; (b)
the strengthening of &NCRs capability in the fields of economic analysis for
investment planning, financial management and accounting procedures, with
special emphasis on implementation of performance budgeting and incremental
long-term variable costing; and (c) progressive reorganization of KNR-s
management along the lines described above to ensure KNR-s smooth transi-
tion to its new status. During negotiations of the Seventh Railway Project,
it was agreed that KNR would become a public corporation no later than
January 1, 1987. Agreement was also reached on a timetable for implementing
the short and medium-term measures. A team of technical assistants financed
from Loan 1836-KO assists KNR in this implementation. This assistance covers
the following areas:
(a) Preparation of a detailed plan of action for transferring
KNR into a public corporation;
(b) Strategic planning;
(c) Investment planning;
(d) Performance budgeting;
(f) Traffic forecasting;
(g) Marketing;
(h) Management Information System;
(i) Commercial accounting;
(j) Traffic costing and tariffing; and
(k) Management training.
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7. ECONOMIC REEVALUATION
7.01 The Sixth Railway Project financed a two-year slice (1978 and
1979) of the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1977-81). The economic evaluation of
the appraisal analyzed separately: (a) the large investments which can be
clearly isolated in terms of the benefit they were to generate; and (b)
other investments which have a network-wide effect and which benefits cannot
be assigned to a particular traffic.
7.02 The large investments analyzed separately, including calculation
of an economic return are:
(a) capacity-increasing investments for increasing freight and
passenger services (or 62% of appraisal project costs); and
(b) way and structures renewals (10%).
The other investments including upgrading the Seoul Suburban Rail System
(7%), a passenger car workshop at Daejon (5%) and miscellaneous investments
C16%), were evaluated based on their individual objective, without calculat-
ing their economic returns as cost-benefit data were lacking.
7.03 The methodology followed for the economic reevaluation is the same
as that of the appraisal. For ease of comparison, cost and benefit figures
were computed in end-1976 constant prices as for the appraisal. The recal-
culated rates of return for the main componnents of the sixth project are as
follows compared to appraisal estimates:
ECONOMIC RATES OF RETURN (Z)
Appraisal Reevaluation
Capacity increase for freight services 40 18
Capacity increase for passenger services
(special and limited express trains) 17 28
Way and structures renewals (weighted
average on the 8 lines included under
the project) 28 28
Overall economic evaluation (for the
3 components above) 30 22
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7.04 As a result of changes in project components, the investments for
capacity increase for freight and passenger services represent 74Z of the
total actual cost of the project, compared to 62% at appraisal. The main
increase is due to the Chung Bug line double-tracking which in itself repre-
sents 28% of the project actual cost (Tables 10 and 11). This added cost
has been entirely allocated to freight services, as the Chung Bug line is
essentially an industrial line. The combined effect of less freight traffic
and higher investment costs resulted in a drop of the ERR to 18% (Table 12).
7.05 The capacity increases for passenger special and limited express
services were well justified. In fact, traffic greatly exceeded forecasts
as a substantial amount of the demand for rail passenger transport shifted
from the ordinary services toward the better services offered by the limited
express. The proportion of this traffic increase from 47% of total pass-km
in 1977 to 61Z in 1982. For 1981, the forecast for limited express passenger
traffic amounted to 7 billion pass-km but the actual figure was 8.8 billion.
Special express services amounting to about 10% of limited express, however,
increased somewhat less than forecast. The return on investments for both
types of service combined is 28%, exceeding largely appraisal estimates
(Table 13).
7.06 The way and structures renewals were the third investment analyzed
at appraisal. It was to amount 10% of total project cost, but due to
deferments and changes of priorities, this component amounted only to 7% of
actual investments. As expenditures were reduced only for track sections
having lesser priority, it is expected that the return on this smaller
investment is at least equal, or possibly higher, to the 28% computed at
appraisal. However, data were not available to carry out a detailed computar
tion and it was deemed not worth to spend more time on such small investment
which return is definitely substantial.
7.07 The weighted overall rate of return is 22% for the three main comr-
ponents of this project, representing about 82% of the total project cost.
Despite the premature double-tracking of the Chung Bug line, the overall
return is within the range expected at appraisal, mainly because of a very
conservative assessment of the traffic forecast, and thus benefits, of
passenger services.
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8. THE ROLE OF THE BANK
Project Objectives
8.01 The project objectives were in general appropriate, and the agreed
modifications of project content and scheduling were justified.
Project Content
8.02 The Bank played an important role in reducing the originally pro-
posed size of the project to what at appraisal was considered technically and
economically justified.
8.03 The actual costs of originally included Bank-financed items was in
total only 91% of the appraisal estimate (varying from 69% to 111% for indivi-
dual items). With the Bank's agreement, the main part of the savings was used
for procurement of additional passenger cars, needed to meet traffic demand,
which up to 1980 increased far beyond the appraisal forecast. In the case of
freight traffic the forecast was far too optimistic (in 1981 the forecast
exceeded the actual traffic by 29%). Consequently, the agreed quantities of
additional freight cars were too high, which resulted in a still existing sur-
plus of freight cars. This situation could have been avoided by using a
system of awarding contracts for a basic quantity of say 80% of the estimated
requirements with an option to add the remaining 20% as needed considering the
traffic development. No further freight cars were included in the seventh
project.
Project Implementation
8.04 The project implementation schedule was in general realistic and
the Bank's assessment of KNR's implementation capacity was correct or even
somewhat on the low side. Although disbursements started about nine months
late, the disbursement schedule was in general realistic, as disbursement for
all originally included items was completed slightly ahead of schedule.
Operating Forecasts
8.05 Appraisal estimates of operating efficiency were in general realis-
tic; however, the utilization of motive power was somewhat lower than forecast
and the utilization of rolling stock declined to levels below forecasts, due
to declining traffic.
Financial Performance
8.06 As under previous projects, KNR did not meet the financial objec-
tives of the project. However, this failure is to be blamed on the
reduction in traffic demand triggered by the worldwide economice recession
started in late 1979 rather than an inadequate tariff increases as was the
case in the past. As can be seen in para. 5.05, tariff increases applied
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during project implementation were broadly in line with inflation for
passengers and exceeded inflation for freight mainly in 1980/81. Thanks to
these increases, KNR' losses on freight traffic decreased substantially and
coal and cement tariffs as of December 31, 1981, generated a net operating
profit. Passenger traffic generated a small net operating profit in 1981
although ordinary train fares were below variable costs and traffic on
express trains was stagnant at the previous year's level. The Bank has been
instrumental in convincing the Government af the necessity of the above
tariff increases.
Institutional Building of [QR
8.07 The Bank has played a useful role in pressing the Government and KNR
to undertake the management study and implement its recommendations along
lines explained in Chapter 6 of this report.
Bank Supervision
8.08 The scope and schedule of supervision missions were adequate in the
context of the borrower's managerial and technical competence. There was good
continuity in Bank staff supervising the project.
Working Relationship
8.09 Project preparation and supervision were greatly facilitated by the
continued close and open-miuded cooperation between Government and KXR
officials and Bank staff built-up during preparation and execution of five
successive projects. The increasing familiarity of Korean officials with
Bank7s objectives, procedures, requirements and Bank staff's awareness of
Koreas problems and customs led to a smooth and efficient dialogue between
the two parties.
9. CONCLUSIONS
9.01 The objectives of the Project were: (a) to increase KNR's capa-
city to enable it to respond to anticipated Increases in passenger and
freight traffic demand; (b) to improve operational efficiency; (c) to
improve KR's financial performance through reductions in operating costs
and tariff adjustments; (d) to monitor progress of the management study
financed from Loan llOl-KO but carried out under Terms of Reference agreed
during negotiations of the Fifth project; and (e) to study the feasibility
of future railway projects (or transport sector projects including a railway
component). Project implementation was generally successful. Physical
investments gave KNR the additional capacity it needed; operational effi-
ciency was good; the project's financial objectives would have been reached
if traffic had not been adversely affected by the 1980-82 worldwide economic
recession; and good progress was made toward the reorganization of M.
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Physical Component
9.02 Most of the major components included in the original project were
completed on schedule. The deferment of implementation of capacity increase
investments listed in paras. 3.09-3.10 and of the construction of the Bugog
terminal had no detrimental effect on KNR's traffic. The additional works
on the Gyeongju by-pass line, the construction and/or extension of stations
and the procurement of 37 additional electric railcars for urban traffic were
well justified. The only project item which could have been reduced is the
number of freight cars which was based on somewhat too optimistic traffic
projections. Project costs were substantially in line with appraisal fore-
casts. The economic return is somewhat below appraisal estimate, but still
very good.
9.03 The only physical project item implementation of which raised a
problem vas the doubling of the whole Chun-Bug line which was not economic-
ally justified. The Government's response to the Bank's objections to it
i.e., the takeover by the Government of the cost of the part of this doubling
not included in the original project was not fully Eitisfactory. it resulted
in transferring the burden of the cost of an uneconomic investment from KNR
to the Government while obliging KNR to bear maintenance and operating costs.
Operations
9.04 Thanks to the dedication and high quality of KNR-s staff,
operating efficiency improved over its already high level during the first
two years of project implementation. The decline in utilization of motive
power and mainly rolling stock during 1980-82 was due to the stagnation of
passenger traffic and the decline in freight traffic.
Finances
9.05 The Government made a commendable effort to raise tariffs main'/
for freight, to catch up for their former inadequacy. Unit costs did not
decrease as anticipated at project appraisal, partly due to high inflation,
but mainly because some project investments were underutilized due to the
above-mentioned slowdown in traffic demand. The inadequacy of ordinary
passenger trains was a major reason behind KNR-s failure to reach the pro-
ject-s financial objective. Despite this major shortL3ming, KNR would have
met this objective if passenger express trains traffic had grown in 1980-81
at the same rate as over 1977-79. The next step towalx- the improvement of
KNR's financial performance will be the establishment of a cost based tariff
system. The Government and the Bank have agreed on a set of measures aimed
at reaching this goal as part of the Seventh Railway project (Loan 1836-KO)
and the Coal and Cement Distribution project (Loan 2267-KO). KNR's financial
performance should improve considerably once its tariff will be cost based
and the pick up of traffic will provide for full utilization of investments
implemented under the Sixth and Seventh Railway Projects.
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Institution Building
9.06 The comprehensive management study r: rried out by a U.S.
consulting firm in association with a Koreai ;nsulting firm was completed in
September 1979. The study's main conclusion is that KNR should be gradually
transformed in a public corporation entrusted with a substantial degree of
managerial freedom and financial independence. During negotiations of the
Seventh Railway Project it was agreed that this goal should be reached no
later that January 1, 1987. Agreement was also reached on a time table for
implementing shortand medium-term measures recommended by the consultants
for assuring a smooth switch in KNR's status and organization. This is
being done with the assistance of consdltants financed from Loan 1836-KO.
Studies
9.07 As mentioned in para. 3.24, the report on the economic feasibility
study of major investments proposed for inclusion in the Seventh Railway
project carried out by a team of local and foreign consultants was of mediocre
quality.
9.08 The final engineering study for the widening of the Su-In line was
sucessfully completed in February 1982, partly financed from Loan 1542-KO.
Follow up Projects
9.09 The effort undertaken under the first six Korea railway projects
are being pursued under the ongoing Seventh projcect and the Coal and
Cement Distribution Project. Completion of the latter project is planned
for December 31, 1986 coinciding with the target data for the establishment
of KNR as a public ccrporation. Implementation of the physical and institu-
tional components of the two projects is expected to transform KNR into the
operationally efficient and financially viable organization eeded for
fuillfilling its role in the Korean economy.
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ANNEX 1
Page 1
KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1542-KO)
PROJECT CONPLETION REPORT
Compliance with Main Covenants in the Loan Agreement
Action required Action taken
Section 3.02
(a) The Borrower shall, not later than The Borrower has complied with
January 1, 1979 or such other date item (VI) commercial account-
as shall be agreed with the Bank, ing. Compliance to the other
take all such action as shall be items is not required since
necessary to enable KNR to operate this section is superseded by
with autonomous powers including, section 3.02 of Loan Agreement
inter alia, the powers (i) to incur 1836-KO (Seventh Railway Pro-
debt; (ii) to fix the emoluments of ject. Under the latter section
its staff; (iii) to prepare and KNR will be established not
submit to MOT and EPB its proposed later than January 1, 1987 as
budgets in a commercial form; a public corporation which will
(iv) to have reasonable flexibility be granted the autnomous p 25s
in adjusting approved operating referred to under items (i) to
budgets to meet costs changes aris- {v).
ing out of unexpected fluctuations
in railroad traffic; (v) to open and
maintain an account with the Bank of
Korea for revenue receipts and pay-
ments of obligations; and (vi) to
maintain its records in accordance
with commercial accounting procedures.
(b) The Borrower shall, not later than Submitted to the Bank in letter
July 1, 1978 or such other data as of October 13, 1978, from EPB.
shall be agreed with the Bank,
furnish to the Bank for review, the
measures taken and to be taken to
meet the objectives referred to in
paragraph (a) of this Section.
Section 3.08
The Borrower shall cause KNR: (a) to The management study was
complete and furnish to the Bank for review carried out by a U.S.
not latter than June 1, 1979 or such other consulting firm in
date as shall be agreed with the Bank, a association with a Korean
consulting firm.
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ANNEX }
Page 2
Action required - Action taken
sanagement study, under terms of reference their final report on September
agreed with the Bank, with a view to mak- 12, 1979. Implementation of
ing recommeudations for strengthening KNR's their recommendations has
capability in the fields of (i) investment started with technical assist-
planning; and (ii) development of technical, ance provided by consulting
financial and economic policies; and (b) to firm assisted by a U.S. con-
implement thereafter such recommendations sulting firm. The relevant
as shall be agreed with the Bank. contract is financed from
Loan 1836-KO (Seventh Railway
Project) and is due for
completion in mid-1984.
Section 3.09
The Borrower shall ensure that RKNR KIST submitted an interim
shall not undertake the carrying out of report to the Office of the
Parts B and C (2) of the Project until the mayor of Seoul in late July
Bank shall have the opportunity to express 1978. The report was highly
its views on the findings of the comprehen- inadequate and KIST submitted
;ive urban transport study of the larger a revised version in early
Seoul metropolitan areas being undertaken 1579. Reportedly the study
by the Transport Economic Group of the did not provide information
Korea Institute of Science and Technology required for evaluating the
(KIST). proposed investments. Analysis
done during appraisal of the
Seventh Project show that KNR
proposed investments in Seoul
suburban services have a satis-
factory economic return of 19%.
The Bank is financing urban
transport studies in Seoul and
other cities under the Seventh
Railway Project.
Section 3.10
The Borrower shall ensure that KNR The Bank received during nego-
shall not undertake the carrying out of tiations a report by a Korean
Part F (1) of the Project until the Bank Engineering Co. dated September
shall have the opportunity to express its 1977 and covering workshop
views on the findings of the studies needs for all kiuds of motive
undertaken by consultants employed by KNR power and rolling stock. KNR
with respect to the construction of the later submitted a separate
proposed Daejon workshop referred to in report for passenger car main-
said Part F (1) of the Project. tenance, including a program
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Page 3
Action required Action taken
for a new passenger car work-
shop at Daejon. After review
by the Bank, construction of
this workshop started in late
1978 and is expected to be comr-
pleted by end 1983.
Section 3.11
The Borrower shall cause KNR to (a) A plan to improve the mainte-
furnish to the Bank for review, not later nance of locomotives and rol-
than December 31, 1978 or such other data ling stock was submitted to the
as shall be agreed with the Bank, a plan Bank o: September 7, 1978. KNR
to improve (i) the maintenance; and (ii) has also given the Bank an
the utilization of KNR's locomotives and acceptable plan to improve the
rolling stocks; and (b) implement such utilization of locomotives and
plan thereafter in consultation with the rolling stock.
Bank.
Section 3.12
(a) The Borrower shall take or cause to KNR undertook several substan-
be taken all action necessary to tial expansions of Project
ensure that substantial changes in items and additional invest-
KNR's Investment Plan shall only be ments without prior concurrence
made with the concurrence of the of the Bank. Justification was
Bank. provided a posteriori and found
acceptable except in case of
(b) For the purpose of this Section Chung Bug Line doubling for
"substantial changes" shall mean which the Government has agreed
changes involving in the aggregate to reimburse KNR. The doubling
either an-increase or a decrease of is now completed.
more than 10 billion won
(W 10,000,000,000) in the estimated
cost of the Investment Plan.
Section 3.13
The Borrower shall cause KNR to: The final report was submitted
(a) furnish to the Bank for review, not in July 1980. Investments were
later than July 1, 1979 or such other agreed in the course of
date as shall be agreed with the Bank, appraising the Seventh Project.
the findings of the feasibility studies
referred to in Part G (5) of the Project;
and (b) obtain the concurrence of the Bank
before undertaking any investments
required for the projects recommended by
such studies.
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Action required Action taken
Section 4.02 (b)
The Borrower shall cause 1N to:
ments (balance sheets, statements of income The audit of KNR's account has
and expenses and related statements) for been done timely every year
each fiscal year audited, in accordance since 1977. The quality of
with appropriate auditing principles con- audit reports has been very
sistently applied, by independent auditors good.
acceptable to the Bank; (ii) furnish to
the Bank as soon as avail:able, but in any
case not later than five months after the
end of each such year, (A) certified
copies of its financial statements for
such year as so audited and (b) the report
of such audit by said auditors, of such
scope and in such detail as the Bank shall
have reasonably requested; and (iii) fur-
nish to the Bank such other information
concerning the accounts and financial
statements of KNR and the audit thereof
as the Bank shall from time to time
reasonably request.
Section 4.04
The Borrower shall cause KUR to take Tariffs were increased as
all necessary measures (including but not follows:
limited to KUR's tariff increases) satis- Freight Passengers
factory to the Bank as shall be required -- (%)
by K1 to: (a) cover its operating costs
(excluding depreciation) and debt service 6/78 15 19
requirements and finance a reasonable 5/79 10 15
proportion of its capital expenditures 1/80 20 20
commencing fiscal year 1979; (b) earn an 8/80 20 20
annual rate of return of not less than 6/81 22 13.5/a
Ci) 2% in fiscal year 1979; (ii) 3.2% in * 12/81 12 5
fiscal year 1980; (ili) 4% thereafter; and 7/82 5 5
(c) attain a ratio of current assets to 12/82 5 5
current liabilities of not less than 1.5
by fiscal year 1979. However, due to lower than
expected traffic growth
explained by a slow down in the
country's economic growth, KiR
/a Except for coal tariffs which were increased by 35%.
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Action required Action taken
has not been able to meet its
financial objectives despite
substantial tariff increases.
Section 4.09
The Borrower shall:
(a) not later than Julv 1, 1980 or such 'The consultants selected
other date as shall be agreed with (Korea Institute for Science
the Bank, carry out and furnish to and Technology - KIST, plus
the Bank for review transport sector individual foreign experts)
studies, under terms of reference to carry out the coal/cement
agreed with the Bank, with a view to distribution study as vell as
preparing feasibility studies of the National Comprehensive
future transport investment projects Transport Study, issued a
to be carried out by the Borrower-s final report on the coal/
departments, agencies and public cement distribution study in
corporations Mhvolved in the trans- June 1980. However, the report
port sector; and was not acceptable to the Bank.
The Coal and Cement Project was
(b) employ consultants whose qualifica- designed jointly by KNR, the
tions, experience and terms and Korea Maritime and Ports Admi-
conditions of employment shall be nistration (KMPA), the Minis-
satisfactory to the Bank to assist tries of Energy and Resources
the Borrower in carrying out the (MOER), Commerce and Industry
said transport sector studies. (MCI), Finance (MOF) and the
Economic Planning Board (EPB)
under the coordination of the
Ministry of Transportation
(NOT). The related loan will
be submitted for Bank Board
approval in late April 1983.
The Bank team in charge of
drafting the Korea Transport
Sector Issues Survey initiated
three transport sector studies.
Two of these, the Seoul Busan
Transport Corridor Study and
the Seoul Region Transport Area
Study are expected to start
shortly. The scope and timing
of the Third one, the South-
eastern Industrial Belt Study,
are under discussion between
the Government and the Bank.
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KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT (Loan 1542-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
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KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Millon Intercity Passenger Traffic 1966-1982
Pass -Km
23,000
22.000 J
2i,00 -Forecost Seventh
20,000 _
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16,000 - Actual
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ANNEX 5-
KOREA
SlXrH RAILWAY PROJECT (Loan 1542-K0)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
KNR Seoul Urban Passenger TraMc 1974-1982
Million
Pass -Km
12.000 _
10.000
/ Forcost Seventh
/ Project (1980)
8.000
/
//
/
/ 
6.000
4,000 Forecast Fith
Project (1974)
___> ~~~~Forecast Sixh
2.00 Project (1977)
1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986
WVild Bank - 2631 5
KOREA
SIlTH RALWAt PFROJCCt (LOAN 1542-tO)
PROJECT CEYLZTION UPOnT
Project Quantities
Index (appraisal estimate
Actual for 1,18-SI - 100)
Appraisal *^ttmatt Carryover fterred Carryover Deferted
To tal Total to tlS2 project to 1983 to 19Q2 Project to 19B1
Unit 1978/79 98O/dlI I978-81 1978/79 1980/82 1978-B oat later total or later 1971-81 or later total ot later
New Ltne Conutrfetton
Siding for FaF ngvon eachtnery complex Index 110 - 110 tOW 120 220 30 250 - 200 27 227 -
Other Items Index tin - lto - - - - - Ito - - - too
tlec:rtftcetion m A.5/a - ./ - -- ./ - - 100
Increase It Statton and Line C iaeety
Double trackIng - Owng kng line Index 110 - 110 1,250 750 2,000 - 2,000 Wl- 1."18
Double tracking - Tangean-Sueseg hx - 9.6/a 9 .6/a - - - - - 9 6/a - - - 100
Double tracking - Seongbug-Euijeonbu km - 1.117 15. - - - - -_ 1.1 7 - - - tIW
Bypess line - Cyeoq6ju Index 110 - 120 210 60 170 330 500 - 255 300 455 -
Narahalltng yard extensaoos Plece 1.5/a O.5f0 2.0/a - - - - - 2.0/a - - - IW
Fretght terminal - SuBOs Index 53 35 110 t00 IS0 250 - 250 - 227 - 227
Freight terminal - Wet Seoul Index 36 74 110 - - - - - 110 - - 100
Station buildings Index 120 - 110 ISW0 - IMSW - 2,500 - 1364 - 1264 -
CIC - Teoajlr-Cyeongju ha 54.5/a 109.0/a 163.5/a - - - - - I). 5J - - - 100
CtC - Dongdaegu-Tongeheoo xa 34.971 - 1' 97 - - - -- 34I - - - 100
Other Ites Index 90 20 Ito 70 70 - 70 40 64 - 64 36
vh and Structures
flail ranwal 50 t ralls Ik 260 - 260 255 - 255 - 255 5 98 i 9s 2
Track renewal, 50 ha raila ha 70 - 70 20 - 20 - 20 50 29 - 29 71
Concrete elespece 150/a - ISO/4 90 - 90 - 90 75 55 - 55 45
Ballast 'OW cu* 32071 - 3207d 34 - 34 - 14 318 10 - 10 90
Separation of rall ad road level Placee 597 - 59fl 23 - 23 23 42 35 - I5 65
Track materiel woherhop Index IWod- - I20 40 s0 120 - 120 - 120 - 120 -
Right-of-way lmprovemette Index 110 - 110 60 - 60 - 60 50 55 - 55 45
Other Iteme Index 110 - 110 125 - 125 - 125 - 114 - 114 -
"aoti"e tqr and Rolltop Stock
Ie; diesel Ieto-Ile toeo otIv s number in - 30 20 7 27 - 27 3 90 - 90 10
Rtew breadown cranes Nusber 2 - 2 - 2 2 - 2 - 100 - too -
Diesel locoeotivee, remodeling NAuber 59 - 59 31 40 71 - 71 - 120 - 120 -
New apecial *xprena pxesnget care Number 45 - 45 45 - 45 - 45 - 00 - 00 -
HNw limited exprese passenger cars Number 166 - 166 38 163 201 - 201 - III - 121 -
Nev box care umbe r 550 - 550 188 362 550 - 550 - 100 - 100 -
New gondoles Musber 870 - R70 621 249 870 - 870 - 100 - too -
Freight car lIprovement Index too - 100 20 - 20 - 20 - 20 - 20 -
othar items Index 100 - 100 gO - s0 - sO - O - 80 -
Rolling Stock Repair facilities
New Dbajeo peexeoger cear repair
facilittle Index 27 83 110 IS 55 70 40 120 - 64 36 100 -
Improvement of *xisting bhachbope Index 110 - 110 10 - 10 - 10 100 8 - 8 92
loprovemeot of exieting ehed Index 220 - 110 60 - 60 - 60 SO 55 - 55 4S
Telecomuoiceotione, Power Facilities and
Others
Telecomuntetione Index 110 - 110 40 - 40 - 40 70 36 - 36 64
Power fetilities Index 110 - 10 25 - 25 - 25 AS 23 - 23 77
lulldinge Index 110 - 110 90 - 90 - gO 20 82 - 82 18
Rousing ftaclittes Index 110 - 110 80 - 80 - sO 30 73 - 73 27
Training end technical Aesstatnee Index 210 - 110 6o 25 85 25 110 - 77 23 100 -
Other items Index 10 - 110 125 - 123 - 225 - 111 - 113 -
/a Plus 102 phyeical contingency,
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Table 3.2
KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1542-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Cost of Items Not Included in the Project
(won million)
Addttional items Local Foreign Total
Improvement of stations for electric operation 8,987 - 8,987
New station of Jeonju /a 2,995 - 2,995
Electric rail cars for SMESRS (37) 10,886 - 10,886
Other items 1,664 30 1,664
Total 24,532 30 24,562
/a Required and financed by the Government.
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Table 3.3
XOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1542-Xt)
PROJECT COMPLET ION REPORT
Procurement Schedule for Bank Financed Items
Events
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Rails (33,000 tons) Appraisal 03/01/78 03/15/78 05/15178 - 06/15/78 07/01/78 01101179 lO/Cl/79
Actual 04/04178 04/13/78 06/16/78 10/30/78 11/14/78 11/17/78 02/24/79 12/30/79
Permanent way workshop Appraisal 04/01/78 04/15178 07/15/78 - 08/15/78 09/01/78 03/01/79 09/01/79
machinery Actual 01/04/79 07/20/79 10/11/79 02/28/80 03/14/79 03/27/80 09/15/80 01/03/81
Track maintenance equipment, Appraisal 03/01/78 03/15178 05/15178 - 06/15/78 07/01/78 01101/79 06/01/79
orginal quantities Actual 04/21/78 05/09/78 06/28/78 07/31178 08/15/78 09/01/78 12/16/78 06/28/79
Track maintenance equipment,
additional:
- Track inspection car (1) la Appraisal - - - - - - - -
- First bidding Actual 08/12/80 09/25/80 12/02/80 Rebidding - -
- Rebidding Actual - 06/22/81 08/07/81 09/22/81 09/28/81 10/02/81 12/15/82 12/15/82
- Rail flow detectors (12) /b Appraisal - - - - - - - -
Actual 11/27/80 12/16/80 01/20/81 03/19/81 04101/81 04/13/81 05/29/81 05129/B1
Breakdown cranes (2) Appraisal 03/15/78 04/01/78 06/15/78 - 07/15/78 08/01/78 06/01/79 07/01/79
- First bidding Actual 04/19/78 05/09/78 07/11/78 Rebidding - - - -
- Rebidding Actual - 08/09/78 09/28/78 12/16/78 12/19/78 12/22/78 02/06/80 02/06/80
Passenger cars, original quantities:
- Special express cars (45) Appraisal 03/15/78 04/01/78 06/15/78 - 07/15/78 08/01/78 08/01/79 02/01/80
Actual 05/11/78 05/16/78 08/01/78 12/18/78 12/21/78 12/22/78 02/19/79 09/19/79
- Limited express care (166) Appraisal 03/15/78 04/01/78 06/15/78 - 07/15/78 06/01/78 08/01/79 02/01/80
Actual 05/11/78 05/16/78 08/01/78 12/18/78 12/21/78 12/22/78 05/15/80 01/03/81
Passenger cars, additional:
- Limited express coaches Appraisal - - - - - - - -
(31) /c Actual 01/26/78 01/31/79 04/03/79 06/28/79 06/29179 07/04/79 07/12/79 07/12/79
- Limited express power Appraisal - - - - - - - -
source cars (4) /c Actual - - - 02/17/79 02/22/79 03/20/79 12/06/79 12/10 79
- Spare parts /d Appratsal - - - - - - - -
Actual 04/28/80 05/06/80 06/25/80 11/10/80 11/26/80 12/02/80 02/13/81 09/02/81
Freight cars (1420) Appraisal 03/15/78 04/01/78 06/15/78 - 07/15/78 08/01/78 04/01/79 04/01/80
Actual 05/11/78 05/16/78 08/01/78 12/18/78 12/21/78 12/22/78 05/02/79 01/21/80
Rolling stock workshop Appraisal 01/15/79 02/01/79 05/15/79 - 06/15/79 07/01/79 01/01/80 01/01/81
equipment Actual 02/16/79 02/21/79 04/27/79 09/05/79 09/19/79 09/29/79 l12/28179 10/03/80
Events: I Bank's agreement on tender documents. /a Item agreed to in Bank's telex 06/11/80.
II Bid invitation. 7b Item agreed to in Bank's telex 11/26180.
III Bid opening 75 Item agreed to in 4nk's telex 12/28/78;
IV Submission of bid evaluation and award proposal to the Bank. Procured through change order.
V Bank's agreement to award of contract. /d Item agreed to in Bank'a telex 01/28/80.
VI Contract date.
VII Start of delivery.
VIII Completion of delivery.
tOREA
SlrXII RAILWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1542-IcO)
PROJECr COMPLETION REPORT
Eltimated and Actual Time (days) for Procurement StepS
Completion of Bank revived of
Delay in bid documents Bid submisston Bid evalustion bid evaluation Award of contract Total bidding Delivery To tclromure.t
prepare- (ro event I (From event If (From event III event IV (Fro event V (Fro event I (From event VI [FoxeentI
tion of to event 11) to event 111) to event IV) to event V) to event VI) to event VI) to event VIII) to event VIII)
htd doAs/a Appralisl Actual Appraisal Actual Appraiaal Actual Appraisal Actual Appraisal Actual Appratisl Actual Appraisal Actual Appraisal Actual
Rall (33,000 tons) 34 14 9 61 64 16 126 15 15 16 1 122 227 457 408 579 615
Permanent way workshop machinery 27' 14 197 93 83 16 140 IS 15 17 13 155 448 365 309 S20 757
Track maintenance equipment,
orginal quantities 51 14 45 61 50 16 33 15 15 16 17 122 160 335 301 457 461
Track maintenance quipment,
additional:
- Track inspecttion car (1) /b
- First biddins - - 44 - 68 Rebidding - - - - -
-Rebidding - - - - 46 - 46 - 6 - 4 102 - 74 - 176
- Rail flow detectors (12) /c - - 20 - 35 - 58 - 13 - 12 - 138 - 46 - 154
Breakdown cranew (2)
- Fivst bidding 35 17 20 75 63 Rebidding - - - - - 92/f 83/f - - - -
- Rebidding - 17 20 75 50 15 79 15 3 17 3 139f 15S 334 411 473 566
PA een,:r cars, original
quantties:
- Special emprees care (45) 57 17 5 75 77 IS 139 15 3 17 1 139 225 549 281 6e8 s06
- Limited express cars (166) 57 11 5 75 77 IS 139 15 3 17 1 139 225 549 799 68 1,024
Passenger cars, additlonal:
- Limtted exprese coaches (31)/d - - 5 - 62 - 86 - I - 3 - 157 - 8 - 165
- Limited expres power source
cars (4) /d - - - - - - - - 5 - 26 - 31 - 264 - 295
_ spare parts/ - - e - 50 138 - 16 - 6 - 213 - 274 - 492
FreIght cars (1420) 57 17 5 75 77 iS 139 IS 3 17 1 139 225 608 395 747 620
Rolling stock workshop equipment 32 17 5 103 65 16 111 1S 14 16 10 167 225 549 369 716 5"t
6vents: I Rank's agreement on tender doetsents. Is Time from appraisal estimate of date for Bank agreement on tender document to actual date.
It lid Invitation. 7S Item agreed to in eank's telex 06/11/S.
Ill Bid opening 7W Item agreed to In ank's telex 11t26/80.
VI Contract date. 7T Only time up to bid invitation.
VII Start of deltiery.
VIlI Completion of deltvery.
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Table 3.5
Page 1 of 2
KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PRO;SCT (LOAN 1542-KO)
PROJECr COMIPLETION REPORT
ProJect Costs (Won million)
Appraisal estimate in- Actual
cluding contingencies Total Quantity Price
Local Foreign Total Local Forelgn Total cost index/a index/b
indexfa
New Line Construct ion
Sidlng for Changweon machinety comple 2,841 - 2,841 9,206 - 9,206 324 237 137
Other items 125 - 125 - - - - - -
Subtotal New Line Construction 2,966 - 2,966 92G6 - 9206 324 237 137
Electriflcation 1,065 1,103 2,168 - - - - -
Increase ln Station and Line Capacity
Double tracking Chung Bug line 2,385 249 2,634 64,859 2,769 67,628 2,624 1,818 141
Double tracklng Yongsan-Susaeg 3,952 1,444 5,036 644/c - 644/c 13 10 130
Double tracking Seongbug-Euijeonbu 4,942 2,029 6,971 4357c - 4357w 6 5 130
By-pass line Gyeongju 982 101 1 083 8,301 - 8,301 766 455 169
Narshalling yard extensions 2,903 193 3,096 - - - - - -
Freight terminal Bugog fd 2,205 - 2,205 7,747 282 8,029 364 227 160
Freight terminal West Seoul 1,714 - 1,714 - - - - - -
Station buildings 154 - 154 2,478 - 2,478 1,609 1,364 118
CTC (about 200 km) 10,300 - 10,300 - - - - -
Other items 11,064 778 11,842 9,367 - 9,367 79 64 124
Subtotal Incr. in Station and
Line Capacity 40,241 4,794 45,035 93,831 3,051 96,882 215 152 142
way and Structures
Rail renewal, 50 kg rails 1,666 5,101 6,767 1,285 4,222 6,207 92 98 94
Track renewal, 50 kg rails 2,668 1,382 4,080 702 386 1,088 27 29 94
Concrete sleepers 2,632 - 2,632 1,666 - 1,666 63 55 116
Ballast 1,643 - 1,643 183 - 183 11 10 115
Separation of rail & road level at
crossings 9,725 - 9,725 3,098 - 3,098 32 35 90
Track material workshop 565 1,231 1,796 977 1,480 2 457 137 120 114
Right-of-way improvements 4,062 - 4,062 3,023 - 3,023 74 55 136
Other items 3,321 537 3,858 3,731 1,458 5,189 134 114 118
Subtotal Way and Structures 26,282 8,251 34,533 14,665 8,246 22,911 66 63 106
Motive Power and Rolling Stock
New diesel main line locomotives 173 12,517 12,690 4,957 7,178 12,135 96 90 106
Nev breakdown cranes 29 783 812 31 635 666 82 100 82
Diesel locomotive remodeling 1,698 10,l09 11,807 1,665 9,963 11,628 98 120 82
Nev special express passenger cars 1,621 8,041 9,662 77 6,954 7,031 73 100 73
New limited express passenger cars 3,208 15,929 19,137 3,348 20,834 24,172 126 121 104
New freight cars - 22,332 22,332 70 21,544 21 614 97 100 97
Improvement of freight cars 4,317 - 4,317 850 - 850 20 20 98
Other items 2,468 471 2,939 2,544 - 2,544 86 80 10l
Subtotal Motive Power and
Rolling Stock 13,514 70,182 83,696 13,532 67,108 S0,640 96 99 97
- 49 -
Table 3 5
Page 2 of 2
Appraisal estimte in- Actual
cluding contingencies Total Quantity Price
Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total cost index/a index/b
index/a
Rolling Stock Repair Facilities
New Daejeon passenger car shop 8,572 3,554 12,126 15,467 2,030 17.497 144 100 144
Improvement of existing backshops 1,115 2,571 3,686 389 - 389 10 8 127
Improvement of existing sheds 2,852 1,093 3,945 2,545 - 2.545 65 55 118
Subtotal Rolling Stock Repair
Facilities 12,539 7 218 19,757 18,401 2,030 20.431 103 74 140
Telecounnications. Power Facilities
Buildings & Others
Telecowunications 1,387 - 1,387 584 - 584 42 36 116
Pover facilities 1,130 63 1,193 295 - 295 25 23 110
Bulldings 1.370 - 1,370 1,254 - 1,254 92 82 112
Housing facilities 1,675 - 1 675 1,469 - 1,469 88 73 121
Training & technical assistance 129 381 510 - 596 596 117 100 117
Other items 2,814 - 2,814 3,623 - 3,623 128 114 113
Subtotal Telecoi,unications.
Power Fac. Bldg. & Others 8,508 444 8,943 7.225 596 7.821 87 76 115
Total Project 105,112 91,992 197,104 156,860 81,031 237,891 121 102 118
Nonproject items (Table 2) - - - 24,532 30 24,532 - - 118
Total Fxpenditures 105,112 91,992 197,104-181,392 81.061 262,453 133 113 118
/a App=alsal estimate - 100. See Table 1.
/b Appraisal cost level - 100.
Ic Cost for land acquisition only.
/d Project completely changed. Completion expected by 1984. Only costs for 1978-1981 included here.
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Table 4.1
KOREA
SIXrH RAILWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1542-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Freight Traffic 1967-82
(Million ton km)
Appralsal Forecasts Ia
Second Third Fourth Fifth Sixth Seventh
Year Zof Z of Z of Z of 0of Actual
actual actual actual actual actual
Second Plan
1967 6,128 6,178
1968 7,163 6,867
1969 7,958 7,484 102 7,828
1970 8,515 8,486 110 7,709
1971 8,961 9,880 126 7,841
Third Plan
1972 11,445 158 7,370 102 7,241
1973 8,147 95 8,591
1974 8,449 94 9,074 10. 9,005
1975 9,035 97 10,047 108 9,293
1976 9,511 98 10,873 112 9,728
Fourth Plan
1977 11,940 114 10,526 100 10,509
1978 13,130 120 11,437 105 1n,926
1979 14,120 128 12,356 112 11,081
1980 13,078 121 11,532 107 10,798
1981 13,956 129 12,026 111 10,815
Fifth Plan
198-2 12,356 113 10,890
1983 12,945
1984 13,329
1985 13,817
1986 14,321
/a In appraisal reportF for the second to the seventh projects.
- 52 -
Table 4.2
KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1542-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Intercity Passenger Traffic 1967-82
(Million passenger km)
Appraisal Forecasts /a
Second Third Fourth Fifth Sixth Seventh
Year x0of z of Z of Z of Z of Actual
actual actual actual actual actual
Second Plan
1§67 9,576
1968 No annual 10,590
1969 forecast 11,363 103 11,077
1970 made 12,256 125 9,818
1971 13,000 13,260 152 8,750
Third Plan
1972 14,418 143 10,043 100 10,062
1973 10,290 96 10.720
1974 10,500 100 11,248 106 10,533
1975 10,901 96 11,818 104 11,386
1976 11,210 90 12,754 103 12,440
Fourth Plan
151T7 13,786 95 14,002 96 14,563
1978 14,680 88 14,672 88 16,588
1979 15,418 90 15,318 90 17,086
1980 15,900 92 19,109 111 17,204
1981 16,455 99 21,022 127 16,553
Fifth Plan
1982 23,221 147 15,838
1983 25,088
1984 26,830
1985 28,372
1986 29,994
/a In appralsal reports for the second to the seventh projects.
- 53 -
Table 4.3
KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1542-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
KNR Seoul Urban Passenger Traffic 1974-82
(Million passenger km)
Appraisal forecast /a
Fifth Sixth Seventh
Year x of % of X of Actual
actual actual actual
Third Plan
1972
1973
1974 193 35
1975 1,922 125 545
1976 2,509 135 1,540
1,865
Fourth Plan
1977 2,762 109 2,560 101 2,536
1978 2,986 86 3,231 93 3,466
1979 3,221 75 3,285 76 4,300
1980 3,365 57 5,881 133 4,436
1981 3,448 69 7,152 143 4,998
Fifth Plan
1982 8,441 163 5,196
1983 9,646
1984 10,718
1985 11,617
1986 12,284
/a In appraisal reports for the fifth to the seventh projects.
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Table 4.4
KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1542-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Selected Operating Statistics 1973-82
Index
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1977-
100
System
Total route (km) 3,142 3,153 3,158 3,135 3,121 3,121 99
Total staff (000) 40.0 40.4 40.2 40.0 40.5 40.4 101
Traffic
Pasengers (million) - intercity 162.2 175.6 183.0 185.0 172.8 161.5 100
- Seoul suburban 139.4 195.4 240.7 245.8 268.4 282.0 202
- total 301.6 371.0 423.7 430.8 441.2 443.5 147
Passenger-km (million) total 17,099 20,054 21,386 21,640 21,551 21,034 123
Average journey (km) 56.7 54.1 50.5 50.2 48.9 47.4 84
Freight net tons (million) 47.6 49.7 50.9 49.0 48.8 47.5 99
Freight net ton-km (million) 10,509 10,926 1l,091 10,798 10,815 10,892 104
Average haul (km) 221 220 218 220 222 229 104
Traffic units (million) 27,608 30,980 32,467 33,438 32,366 31,926 116
Traffic Density
Passenger-km per route-km ('000) 5,442 6,360 6,772 6,903 6,905 6,740 124
Freight net ton-km per route-km (-000) 3,345 3,465 3,509 3,444 3,465 3,489 104
Operations
Train-km (million) - passenger trains /a 36.9 39.2 41.6 43.3 45.3 47.6 129
- freight trains 21.3 22.2 22.5 22.0 21.9 21.6 101
- total 58.2 61.4 64.1 65.3 67.2 69.2 119
Freight-km (million) - diesel locomotives 45.0 46.0 48.8 49.7 51.1 61.2 136
- electric locomotives 8.3 9.4 9.4 9.3 9.3 9.3 112
- diesel railcars 10.6 10.4 10.7 11.9 12.3 12.9 122
- electric railcars 24.4 36.3 42.1 43.1 55.1 56.8 215
- total 90.3 102.1 111.0 114.0 127.8 140.2 155
Passenger car-km (million) 287 315 340 356 389 408 142
Freight car-km (million) - loaded 245 251 252 262 262 263 107
- empty 185 193 200 173 168 168 91
- total 430 444 452 435 430 431 100
Operating Efficiency
Traffic units per employee ('000) 690 767 808 810 799 790 114
Passenger-ku per passenger train-km 463 512 515 500 476 442 95
Freight net ton-km per freight train-km 493 492 491 490 493 505 102
Passenger-km per passenger car-km 59.6 63.7 62.9 60.8 55.4 51.6 89
Freight net ton-km per loaded freight car-km 42.9 43.5 44.0 41.2 41.3 41.4 97
Passenger-km per available passenger car ('000) /a 9,359 1C. 584 11,018 12,805 9,773 8,724 93
Freight net ton-km per available freight car (d0-0) 712 747 727 683 698 708 99
Freight car turnaround tlme 5.1 4.9 5.0 5.0 4.8 4.8 94
Availability
Diesel locomotives, main line (2) 86.9 88.2 89.7 89.5 89.4 91.2 105
Electric locomotives (2) 85.2 89.9 90.0 90.0 88.9 90.0 106
Passenger cars (S) 89.4 91.2 91.2 91.0 90.8 92.8 104
Freight cars (:) 91.5 93.1 94.0 93.8 93.4 94.2 103
/a Including railcars.
KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1542-KO)
PROJECr COMPLETION REPORT
Operational Performance
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Actual Forecast Actual Forecast Actual Forecast Actual Forecast Actual Forecast Actual
AvailabilLty of Rolling Stock (2)
Main line locomotives, diesel 86.4 87.0 86.9(100) 87.5 88.2(101) 88.0 89.7(102) 88.5 89.5(10l) 89.0 89.4(100)
Maln line locomotives, electric 84.6 85.0 85.2(100) 85.5 89.9(105) 86.0 90.0(105) 87.0 90.0(103) 88.0 88.9(101)
Passenger cars 88.7 89.0 89.4(100) 89.5 91.2(102) 90.0 91.1(101) 90.5 91.0(101) 91.0 90.8(100)
Freight cars 89.3 90.0 91.5(102) 91.0 93.1(102) 92.0 94.0(102) 93.0 93.8(101) 93.0 93.4(100)
Locomotive-km ter Available Mlain Line
Locomotive ('000)
Diesel 152 173 157( 91) 174 158(91) 174 156(90) 175 157(90) 175 156(89)
Electric 118 120 120(100) 122 117(96) 124 117(94) 127 115(91) 130 117(90)
Parssenger Car-km per Available
Passenger Car ('000)
Special express coaches 187 237 213( 90) 256 230( 90) 267 239( 90) 277 225(81) 285 247(87)
Limited express coaches 196 204 212(104) 215 242(113) 226 244(108) 237 224(95) 248 244(98)
Turnaround Tlme for Freight Cars (days)
Box cars 5.7 5.7 5.3(108) 5.5 5.2(106) 5.3 5.5(96) 5.1 6.4(80) 4.9 6.6(74)
Gondolas 4.4 4.3 4.4( 98) 4.1 4.2( 98) 3.9 4.2(93) 3.8 4.2(80) 3.7 3.8(97)
Flat cars 6.4 6.2 6.3( 98) 6.1 8.1( 75) 6.0 9.3(65) 5.9 8.7(68) 5.8 9.3(62)
Container cars 3.8 2.5 2.3(109) 2.4 2.4(100) 2.4 3.4(71) 2.4 5.9(41) 2.3 3.4(66)
Average Load per Loaded Car (tons)
Coal 45.0 45.3 45.8(101) 45.4 46.2(102) 45.5 46.7(103) 45.6 46.8(103) 45.7 47.2(103)
Cement 45.4 45.6 46.0(101) 45.7 46.3(101) 45.9 46.5(101) 46.0 47.1(102) 46.1 47.1(102)
Ore 43.9 44.3 44.1(100) 44.5 44.9(101) 44.7 45.4(102) 44.9 46.2(103) 45.1 46.8(104)
Oil 42.0 42.2 41.4( 98) 42.4 41.0( 97) 42.6 41.6( 98) 42.8 41.9( 98) 43.0 42.2( 98)
General cargo 42.3 42.5 43.2(102) 42.5 40.3( 95) 42.5 42.4(100) 42.5 46.4(109) 42.5 43.6(103)
Numbers In brackets indicate X of forecast (for turnaround time inverted % of forecast).
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Table 5.1
ItOr
S1XSH RAILUBY PROJ2CTS (LOAN 1542-EK)
PROJECT COMPLETION NEPORT
Income Stat_nts. 1977-82
(won biltlon)
1932
1977 1978 1979 1930 191 Ar Clog
Appraisal Actual Appraisal Actu=l AppraSal- Actual Appralsal ACtua1 Appraisal Actual pr issiIs tattIsate
Traffic
Psassngars (pass-ka million) 16.562 17,099 17,873 20.054 1B.603 21,551 19,265 21.640 19,903 21,551 31.662 21.034
Freight Ctor k. sulLon) 10.526 10,508 11.437 10.926 12.356 11,061 13,078 10.798 13,956 10,815 12,356 10,8g0
_ota' fTaffic-Units Milton) 2 -8a 27.608 29.310 30,980 30,959 32,634 32.343 32.438 33.859 32.366 44.018 31.92'
Cross 0 tat R-su
In Dow_b r 31. LS76 Tariffs
Passengers 66.7 67.6 73.4 78.8 80.0 91.3 87.9 92.8 93.5 95.7 190.7 127.5
Frsight 59.5 52.4 65.1 53.3 70.2 55.0 74.3 52.2 79.3 53.9 77.7 90.7
Oth-r 3.9 8.0 7.6 13.5 8.1 13.3 6.6 17.5 9.0 21.9 28.3 13.6
Subtotal 135.1 128.0 146.1 145.6 158.3 159.6 170.8 162.5 181.8 171.5 296.7 23i.8
Add: Renuve from ta-riffs Sncrassa
PassBr
fOEDlrs of Implementation - - lot, 19SZ lOt, 152, 10, 201, Jan I IO, 13.57, Jun 1 202 S. Jul I
Apr I Jun I Jan I Ray I Jan 1 2 0m AugI Jan I 5t Doc I Jan 1 4.5S Dec IS
Revenue - - 5.3 8.3 15.6 28.2 26.2 72.3 38.0 108.6 144.3 96.6
dats of Implemntation 121 152 152 152 101 15t, 202, J^n 1 102, 22.3X, Jun 1 102 4.7' Jul I
Jan 1 Apr I Jun 1 Jan I May I Jan 1 251, Aug I Jan 1 11.92, Dec I Jan 1 6.62 Dec 15
Revsnue - 6.3 7.4 11.7 22.7 20.6 38.7 45.8 53.4 76.8 65.2 76.2
Subtotal - 6.3 12.7 20.5 38.3 48.8 64.9 118.1 91.4 185.4 209.5 172.8
Totals
P-s e-nera 66.7 67.6 78.7 87.6 95.6 119.5 114.1 165.1 131.5 204.3 335.0 224.1
ThUu iiiidus to IRP lb - 6.2 3.2 10.7 5.9 12.7 8.8 24.0 11.6 33.2 - -
Fr-ight 59.5 58.7 72.5 65.0 92.9 75.6 113.0 98.0 132.7 110.7 142.9 166.9
Of which due to HRP /b - 10.0 - 14.9 - 24.4 - 22.1 - 24.4 - -
Other 8.9 8.0 7.6 13.5 8.1 13.3 8.6 17.5 q.0 21.9 28.3 13.6
Total Cross Operating Revenuv 135.1 134.3 158.8 166.1 196.6 208.4 235.7 280.6 273.2 356.9 506.2 404.6
Operating xpenmss
Labor 60.7 64.9 72.3 79.0 81.4 103.5 91.5 136.7 102.2 167.6 Z02.5 191.5
Fuel 16.2 15.9 18.6 18.0 21.8 26.2 21.0 47.8 24.5 76.1 82.9 82.2
Naintananea 27.4 25.7 34.6 29.9 38.0 34.7 42.0 47.6 46.1 51.6 63.2 55.8
Ceneral 13.7 12.8 1640 15.9 15.0 18.1 16.0 20.9 17.0 23.0 38.4 28.0
Subtotal 118.0 119.3 139.5 142.8 156.2 182.5 172.5 253.0 189.8 318.5 387.0 357.5
Less: Econmes due to hIP (h) - - 4.6 - 5.4 - 7.8 - 9.1 - - -
Total Working Expenses 118.0 119.3 134.9 142.8 150.8 182.5 164.7 253.0 110.7 318.5 327.0 357.5
Depreciation 17.4 17.3 20.9 20.5 23.8 26.2 28.2 28.7 31.1 43.6 34.6 16.2
Total Operatina Expenses 135.4 136.3 155.8 163.3 174.6 208.6 192.9 281.7 213.8 362.1 421.6 403.7
Nst Operating Revrnue (Loss) (0.3) (2-3) 3.0 2.3 22.0 (0.2) 42.8 (1.1) 59.4 (5.2) 84.6 0-9
Interest charges 20.3 16.3 22.0 23.8 28.5 29.7 33.5 48.6 37.7 60.1 64.6 80.6
Set Nonoperating Revenue 0.5 (1.4) 1.0 (1.3) 1.3 5.0 1.5 4.2 1.8 2.4 (2.2) 5.0
Net Revenue (Deficlt) (20.1) (20.0) (18.0) (22.3) (5.2) (24.9) 10.8 (45.5) 23.5 (62.9) 17.6 (74.7)
Subsidy froi Coverment 21.7 21.7 14.6 21.4 12.0 31.9 7.5 5.0 - - - 34.8
Set Income (Loss) 1.6 1.7 (3.43 (0.9) 6.8 7.0 18-3 (40.5) 23.5 (62.9) 17.6 (39.9)
Ratios
Working 87 89 83 86 76.5 88 70 90 66 89 76 88
Operating (2) 100 101 98 98 89 100 82 1O0 78 101 83 100
Interest charge coverage 0.5 (0.1) 0.1 0.1 n.8 - 1.3 (0.2) 1.6 (0.1) 1.3 0.1
Return on average net fixed
assets (:) in use - - 0.3 0.3 2.1 - 3.5 - 4.2 - 5.5 -
/s Seventh Railway Project.
7; management Ratiomalizatton Plan.
KOREA
517.H RAILWAY PROJECTS (LOAN 1542-O)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Cash Flow' Statment 1977-82
(Current Von bINidltN)
1982
1976 197? 1978 1979 1980 191 Ap- Totals 1977-82
Actual Appraisal A Icual Appraisal Actual Appraisal Actual Appraisal Actual AppraiSal Actual praltsl/a Actuel Appratial Actual
SOURCES OF FUNDS
Cash Generzt*7 bY 'RR
NWot p`a-ting revenue (10.0) (0.3) (2.3) 3.0 2.8 22.0 (0.2) 42.8 (1.1) 59.4 (5.2) 84.6 (0.9) 211.S (5.1)
Depreciation 15.0 17.4 17.3 20.9 20.5 23.1 26.2 28.2 28.7 33.1 43.2 34.6 46.2 158.0 182.1
Not nonoparating revenue
(expensee) 6.4 0.5 (1.4) 1.0 (1.3) 1.3 5.0 1.5 - 1.S 2.3 - 5.0 7.7 9.6
Total Cash Generated 11.4 17.6 13.6 24.9 22.0 47.1 31.0 72.S 27.6 94.3 40.3 119.2 52.1 377.2 186.6
Sales of Assets - 0.7 - 0.8 - 0.9 - 0.9 - 1.0 - 10.0 2.0 14.3 2.0
Increase fn eaverance pay
proviston 1.4 - (0.1) - - - 2.4 - 3.2 - 3.2 1.6 3.0 - 11.7
Funds provided by Government
Operating eubsidy 13.7 21.7 21.7 14.6 21.4 12.0 31.8 7.5 5.0 - - - 34.8 55.8 114.7
Investnents 0.9 - 0.8 3.0 0.6 4.S 37.8 9.7 22.2 3.1 22.9 48.8 18.0 69.1 102.3
Total Funde Provided
by Government 14.6 21.7 22.5 17.6 22.0 16.5 69.6 17.2 27.2 3.1 22.9 486. 52.8 124.9 217.0
Borrowing
Bank Loan 1542-tO - - - 2.4 - 49.7 36.6 5.8 17.3 - 6.2 - 0.6 57.9 62.7
Other foreisn borrowinA 25.9 10.R 25.0 25.8 22.4 11.2 4.6 42.8 6.- 42.8 21.3 67.4 33.4 220.8 113.1
Local horrowin9 33.2 11.3 24.0 Sl.F 35.0 35.0 46.2 33.0 92.6 30.0 92.1 122.5 144.0 305.3 434.7
Total Arrowins 59.1 64.1 49.0 79.7 5.4 95.9 87.4 81.6 116.5 72.' 121.6 189.9 178.0 5M4.0 609.9
Decrease In Other Assets - - 3.1 - 6.4 - 0.9 - 10.6 - 10.9 - - - 31.9
Ex-Railroad Funds
Total Source of Funds 86.5 104.1 88.3 IZ3.0 107.8 160.4 191.1 172.2 185.1 171.2 196.9 369.5 267.9 1.100.4 1.059.1
APPLICATION OF FUNDS
CAFptiteln Istuentm
Inforelgn exciiinge - 45.7 25.0 58.4 22.4 60.9 41.2 66.3 23.7 66.3 29.5 67.4 34.0 359.0 175.6
In local currency - 30.h 40.4 28.2 41.7 54.9 91.9 48.6 134.6 42.8 106.5 161.0 142.1 392.3 557.2
Totel Capital Investments 2.9 76.5 65.4 86.6 64.1 115.8 133.1 114.9 158.3 109.1 116.0 248.4 176.1 751.3 713.0
Debt Service
Intereat 35.3 20.3 16.1 22.0 23.0 28.5 29.7 33.5 48.6 37.7 60.0 64.6 80.6 206.6 259.0
Repayment 14.6 15.9 17.7 14.4 16.6 15.6 18.5 19.4 36.4 22.6 35.6 41.6 40.9 129.5 165.7
Total Ilebt Service 29.7 36.2 34.0 36.4 40.4 44.1 48.2 52.9 85.0 60.3 95.6 106.2 123.9 336.1 424.7
Increase In othet aasets - - - - - 1.S - - - 1.6 - - - 3.1
Total Appiceation of
runds 82.6 112.7 99.4 123.0 104.5 159.9 162.8 167.R 243.3 169.4 233.2 354.6 297.6 1,087.4 1,160.8
Annual chanote In .arkint
capital 1,9 (8.6) (11.3) - 3.3 0.5 a.9 4.4 (58.2) 1.8 (34.3) 14.9 (9.7) 15.7 (101.1)
Ratio
Debt service coverage 0.4 n.5 n.5 0.7 0.7 1.1 0.7 1.4 0.S 1.6 0.4 1.3 0.5 1.0 0.4
/A Seventh Ralivay Project.
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Tabla 5.3
KOREA
51XTH RAILUAT PKOJECrS (LOAN 1542-K)
PROJECT COFLTION REPORT
RIlente Shouts. 1977-82
(won billlon)
1982
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 Ar- Cloau
Actual Appraisal Actual AppraIsal^ Actual AppraIsel Actual Appraisal Actu-l AppraLsal Actual praisal/s Estimate
ASSETS
Current flests
Cash 5.4 5.9 6.2 3.1 8.7 3.1 8.9 3.1 10.4 3.1 8.1 21.1 9.2
Account receivable 9.4 8.1 6.7 11.0 9.3 12.8 30.5 17.4 10.7 19.5 14.1 23.8 16.7
lnventorlss 14.6 15.1 15.1 18.4 22.0 21.0 22.9 23.2 26.5 26.0 28.3 57.5 30.7
Other current assets - - 1.2 - 2.9 - 5.8 - 7.1 - 3.5 20.0 3.5
Total Current Asetst 29.4 29.1 29.2 32.5 42.9 36.9 68.1 43.7 54.7 48.6 5S.0 122.4 60.1
Lass Currant Liabilities
Account. payable 4.5 9.4 12.4 11.4 11.4 13.0 21.5 13.9 34.5 15.0 47.4 30.7 50.2
Current aturittes 4.6 4.8 15.5 5.2 19.5 6.5 21.0 7.5 32.1 9.0 38.4 41.6 38.9
Other current liabilities 6.2 6.0 5.0 7.0 8.6 8.0 13.9 8.5 34.6 9.0 49.1 20.8 61.6
Total Current Liabillties 15.3 20.2 32.9 23.6 39.7 27.5 56.4 29.9 101.2 33.0 134.1 93.1 150.7
Set Working Capital I4f. 8.9 (3.7) 8.9 3.2 9.4 11.7 13.8 (46.5) 15.6 (80.9) 29.3 (90.6)
FPxed Assets
In us* Land 223.2 225.9 225.3 265.4 234.3 292.8 428.4 317.3 423.7 341.3 479.0 395.0 531.4
Other 736.9 799.6 812.3 920.0 873.5 1,091.6 1,022.6 1,274.3 1.212.5 1,467.9 17008.6 1,566.6 1.935.0
Subtotal gross value
of Fized Assets 960.1 1.025.5 1.O37.6 1.185.4 1,ia7.8 1,384.4 1,451. 0 1,591.6 1,636.2 1,809.2 2.187.6 1.961. 6 2.466.4
Less Accumulated Depreciation 193.3 216.2 209.0 235.4 229.5 256.9 256.6 282.6 305.1 313.7 439.6 317.7 493.1
Subtotal Not Fixed
Assets In use 766.1 809.3 828.6 950.0 878.3 1,127.5 1,194.4 13088 1,lll 311 ,495.5 1,74680 1,643.9 1,973L
Work in progress 24.1 32.7 18.0 32.7 38.4 32.7 75.8 32.7 134.8 32.7 113.1 28.8 132.1
Total Net Fixad Assets 790.9 842.0 866.6 982.7 916.7 1.160.2 1.270.2 1.341.5 1.465.9 1,525.2 1,861.1 1.672.7 2.105.4
Other AAsse
Deferred assets - - 33.0 - 51.2 - 40.1 - 130.6 - 60.3 51.2 60.3
Hiscellaneous other 0.1 7.4 3.2 7.4 3.3 7.4 3.4 7.4 5.6 7.4 9.8 4.2 9.8
Total Other Assets 0.1 7.4 36.2 7.4 54.5 7.4 43.5 7.4 136.2 7.4 70.1 55.4 70.1
GRAND TOTAL ASSETS 805.1 858.3 879.1 999.0 974.4 1,177. 0 1,325.4 1,3627 1, 555.6 1,850.3 I.547.4 2.084.9
LAIILITIES
Long-Ter: Debt
Loan capital 245.1 275.0 286.1 340.3 351.4 420.6 416.7 482.8 590.8 533.0 690.6 843.0 827.7
Provision for severance pay 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.3 6.2 3.3 8.4 3.3 11.3 3.3 13.7 8.0 16.7
Total Lonur-era Debt 248.4 278.3 289.3 343.6 357.6 423.9 425.1 486.1 602.1 536.3 704.3 851.0 864.4
Equity Equivalent
Capital 71.1 64.9 61.5 82.5 61.5 99.0 61.5 116.2 61.5 119.3 61.5 61.5 61.5
Revsluetion of aesets 521.0 504.3 511.2 586.3 539.8 681.1 763.2 784.9 847.8 904.3 1.076.9 675.1 l.164.4
Accumulated surplus (loss) (35.4) 10.8 (6.4) 13.4 (51.2) (27.0) (116.6) (24.5) (162.1) (8.7) (182.4) (104.3) (228.2)
Covernment contributions - - 45.9 - 66.7 - 192.2 - 206.3 - 190.0 274.1 242.8
TotAl Equity Equivalent 556.7 580.0 589.8 655.4 616.8 753.1 900.3 876.6 953.5 1,014.9 1 166.0 906.4 1,240.5
GRA.SD TOTAL LIARILITIES 805.1 858.3 879.1 999.0 914.4 1.77.0 1,3 25A. 1,362.7 1.555.6 1.551.2 1,850.3 1,757.4 2,084.9
Ratios
Current 1.7 1.4 0.9 1.4 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.5 0.5 1.5 0.4 1.3 0.4
Liquid 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.7 0.2
Debt to equlty 29171 32/68 35/67 35/65 37/63 36/64 32/68 36/64 39/61 3;165 38/62 48/52 41/59
/s Seventh Railway Project.
KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECTS (LOAN 1542-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Unit Traffic Revenue and Cost - 1977
Traffic Total Operating Net oper. Unit Operating Unit net. Operating
(PK/TK Revenue Cost Variable Fixed revenue Revenue Cost Variable Fixed oper.Rev. ratio
million) ---- (won million) -------------- --… ---------- (won) ----------------- ()
Passenger
Saemaul Express 550 5,554 2,612 2,288 324 2,942 10.10 4.75 4.16 0.59 5.35 47.03
Ltd. Exp. (Air cond.) 122 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ltd. Express 6,291 32,821 18,448 11,662 6,782 14,373 5.22 2.93 1.85 1.08 2.28 56.21
Ord. Expreas 1,357 5,433 5,169 2,774 2,395 264 4.00 3.88 2.04 1.76 0.19 95.14
Ordinary 5,463 13,922 28,476 15,280 13,196 -14,554 2.55 5.21 2.80 2.42 -2.66 205.54
Seoul Urban 2,536 9,843 7,337 3,722 3,615 2,506 3.88 2.89 1.47 1.43 0.99 74.54
Military 401 1,549 1,143 965 178 406 3.86 2.85 2.41 0.44 1.01 73.79
Commuter 380 606 2,943 1,309 1,634 -2,337 1.59 7.74 3.44 4.30 -6.15 485.64
Subtotal 17,100 69,728 66,128 38,000 28,128 3,600
Freight
Coal 3,933 20,664 23,668 17,373 6,295 -3,004 5.25 6.02 4.42 1.60 -0.76 114.54
Cement 1,781 11,702 11,038 8,116 2,922 664 6.57 6.20 4.56 1.64 0.37 94.33
Ores 785 4,329 4,779 3,432 1,347 -450 5.51 6.09 4.37 1.72 -0.57 110.40
Oil 732 4,590 4,743 3,233 1,510 -153 6.27 6.48 4.42 2.06 -0.21 103.33
Fertilizer 561 3,261 4,077 2,445 1,632 -816 5.81 7.27 4.36 2.91 -1.45 125.02
Grain 289 1,725 2,274 1,268 1,006 -549 5.97 7.87 4.39 3.48 -1.90 131.83
Container 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Miscellaneous 1,830 12,471 12,481 7,997 4,484 -10 6.81 6.82 4.37 2.45 -0.01 100.08
Military 383 1,888 3,003 1,670 1,333 -1,115 4.93 7.84 4.36 3.48 -2.91 159.06
KNR 215 1,801 1,767 1,017 750 34 8.38 8.22 4.73 3.49 0.16 98.11
Subtotal 62,431 67,830 46,551 2 1,27 -5,399
Total 27,609 132,159 133L958 84.551 49,407 -1,799
KOReA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECTS (LOAN 1542-KO)
PROJECT COHPLETION REPORT
Unit Traffic Revenue and Cost - 1978
Traffic Total Operating Net oper. Unit Operating Unit net. Operating
(PK/TK Revenue Cost Variable Fixed revenue Revenue Cost Variable Fixed oper.Rev. ratio
millton) --------------- (won million) ------------ (von) - …- ------ (won) (Z)
Passenger
Saemaul Express 645 7,850 3,024 2,633 391 4,826 12.17 4.69 4.08 0.61 7.35 38.52
Ltd. Exp. (Air cond.) 461 3,871 1,694 1,107 587 2,177 8.40 3.67 2.40 1.27 4.00 43.76
Ltd. Express /,852 43,629 20,439 14,110 6,329 23,190 5.56 2.60 1.80 0.81 2.28 46.85
Ord. Express 1,287 4,908 4,970 2,680 2,290 -62 3.81 3.86 2.08 1.78 -0.19 101.26
Ordinary 5,425 14,707 32,967 17,766 15,201 -18,260 2.71 6.08 3.27 2.80 -3.66 224.16
Seoul Urban 3,466 14,702 11,747 5,988 5,759 2,955 4.24 3.39 1.73 1.66 0.99 79.90
Military 516 1,816 1,501 1,437 64 315 3.52 2.91 2.78 0.12 0.01 82.65 o
Commuter 402 751 3,587 1,467 2,120 -2,836 1.87 8.92 3.65 5.27 -7.15 477.63
Subtotal 20,054 92,234 79,929 47,188 32,741 12,305
Frelght
Coal 3,963 23,553 27,726 20,140 7,586 -4,173 5.94 7.00 5.08 1.91 -1.05 117.72
Cement 1,846 13,275 12,984 9,651 3,333 291 7.19 7.03 5.23 1.81 0.16 97.81
Ores 741 4,384 5,230 3,736 1,494 -846 5.92 7.08 5.04 2.02 -1.14 119.30
Oil 868 5,951 6,390 4,399 1,991 -439 6.86 7.36 5.07 2.29 -0.51 107.38
FertilLaer 595 3,841 4,713 2,980 1,733 -872 6.46 7.92 5.01 2.91 -1.47 122.70
Graln 338 2,274 2,636 1,687 949 -362 6.73 7.80 4.99 2.81 -1.07 115.92
Container 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hiscellaneous 1,970 13,601 14,154 9,856 4,298 -553 6.90 7.18 5.00 2.18 -0.28 104.07
Military 376 1,9$5 2,967 1,887 1,080 -1,022 5.17 7.89 5.02 2.87 -2.72 152.54
KNR 228 2,307 2,029 1,225 804 8 8.93 8.90 5.37 3.53 0.04 99.61
Subtotal 10,926 70,861 7P,829 55,561 23,268 -7,968
Total 30,980 163,095 158,758 102,749 56,009 4,337
_ _ _ _ _ ..~~~~~~
KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECTS (LOAN 1542-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Unit Traffic Revenue and Cost - 1979
Traffic Total Operating Net oper. Unit Operating Unit net. Operating
(PK/TK Revenue Cost Variable Fixed revenue Revenue Coat Variable Fixed oper.Rev. ratio
million) ------ (won million) -------------- ----------------- (von) ----------------- (2)
Passenger
Saemaul Express 772 12,240 4,552 4,001 551 7,688 15.85 5.90 5.18 0.71 9.96 37.19
Ltd. Exp. (Air cond.) 530 5,986 2,417 1,927 490 3,569 11.29 4.56 3.64 0.92 6.73 40.38
Ltd. Express 8,252 56,492 26,922 17,740 9,182 29,571 6.85 3.26 2.15 1.11 3.58 47.66
Ord. Expruss 1,207 5,856 6,989 3,214 3,775 -1,133 4.85 5.79 2.66 3.13 -0.94 119.35
Ordinary 5,492 17,991 43,381 22,145 21,236 -25,390 3.28 7.90 4.03 3.87 -4.62 241.13
Seoul Urban 4,300 21,310 14,071 6,362 7,709 7,239 4.96 3.27 1.48 1.79 1.68 66.03
Hilitary 399 2,204 1,463 1,377 86 741 5.52 3.67 3.45 0.22 1.86 66.38
Commuter 434 928 5,114 2,048 3,066 -4,186 12.14 11.78 4.72 7.06 -9.65 551.08
Subtotal 21,386 123,008 104,909 58,814 46,095 18,099
Freight
Coal 3,892 25,383 33,700 20.30 13,380 -8,317 6.63 8.80 5.31 3.49 -2.17 132.77
Cement 2,085 17,053 18,026 11,210 6,816 -973 8.18 8.65 5.38 3.27 -0.47 105.71
Ores 817 6,008 6,391 4,292 2,099 -383 7.35 7.82 5.25 2.57 -0.47 106.37
01i 931 8,317 8,607 4,929 3,678 -290 8.93 9.24 5.29 3.95 -0.31 103.49
Fertilizer 525 3,799 5,400 2,744 2,656 -1,601 7.24 10.29 5.23 5.06 -3.05 142.14
Grain 351 2,539 3,402 1,809 1 594 -864 7.23 9.70 5.15 4.54 -2.46 134.03
Container 254 2,080 1,327 764 563 753 8.19 5.22 5.01 2.22 2.96 63.80
Miscellaneous 1,622 11,424 15,280 8,502 6,778 -3,856 7.04 9.42 5.24 4.18 -2.38 133.75
Military 411 2,463 4,211 2,140 2,071 -1,748 15.99 10.25 5.21 5.04 -4.25 170.97
KNR 256 2,695 2,870 1,446 1 424 -175 10.53 11.21 5.65 5.56 -0.68 106.49
Subtotal 11,081 8 99,215 58,156 41,059 -17,454
Total 32,467 204,769 258,758 116,970 87,154 645
KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECTS (LOAN 1542-KO)
PROJECT COHPL8TION REPORT
Unit Traffic Revenue and Cost - 1980
Traffic Total Operating Net oper. Unit operating Unit not. Operating
(PK/TK Revenue Cost Variable Fixed revenue Revenue Cost Variable Fixed oper.Rev. ratlo
million) --------------- (won million) -------------- ----------------- (won) ----------------- ()
Passenger
Saemaul Expresa 797 18,092 8,208 6,337 1,871 9,884 22.70 10.30 7.95 2.35 12.40 45.37
Ltd. Exp. (Air cond.) 727 10,938 5,322 3,805 1,517 5,616 15.05 7.32 5.23 2.09 7.72 48.66
Ltd. Express 7,739 72,774 36,569 25,635 10,934 36,205 9.40 4.73 3.31 1.41 4.68 50.25
Ord. Express 1,230 7,803 10,915 4,464 6,451 -3,112 6.34 8.87 3.63 5.24 -2.53 139.88
ordinary 5,883 25,699 59,411 30,478 28,933 -33,712 4.37 10.10 5.18 4.92 -5.73 231.18
Seoul Urban 4,436 26,829 17,275 6,599 10,676 9,554 6.05 3.89 1.49 2.41 2.15 64.39
Military 400 3,370 2,039 1,774 265 1,331 8.43 5.10 4.44 0.66 3.33 60.50
Commuter 428 3,914 10,053 4,484 5,569 -6,139 9.14 23.49 10.48 13.01 -14.34 256.85
Baggage 434 8,247 11,746 3,042 8,704 -3 499 19.00 27.06 7.01 20.06 -8.06 142.43
Subtotal 22,074 177,666 161,538 86,618 74,920 16,128
FreIght
Coal 3,943 33,953 45,620 28,923 16,697 -11,667 8.61 11.57 7.34 4.23 -2.96 134.36
Cement 2,018 22,475 23,281 14,830 8,451 -806 11.14 11.54 7.35 4.19 -0.49 103.59
ores 798 7,893 8,717 5,788 2,929 -824 9.89 10.92 7.25 3.67 -1.03 110.44
Oil 461 11,072 10,076 6,106 3,970 996 13.29 12.10 7.33 4.77 1.20 91.00
Fertilizer 833 4,548 5,913 3,311 2,602 -1,365 9.87 12.83 7.18 5.64 -2.96 130.01
Grain 310 3,050 3,756 2,201 1,555 -706 9.84 12.12 7.10 5.02 -2.28 123.15
Container 179 1,948 1,178 743 435 770 10.88 6.58 4.15 2.43 4.30 60.47
MLacellaneous 1,601 14,710 19,041 11,596 7,445 -4,331 9.19 11.89 7.24 4.65 -2.71 129.44
Military 406 3,291 5,212 2,914 2,298 -1,921 8.11 12.84 7.18 5.66 -4.73 158.37
KNR 177 3,674 3,672 1,975 1,697 2 20.76 20.75 11.16 9.59 -0.01 99.95
Subtotal 10,726 106,614 126,466 78,387 48,079 -19,852
Total 32,800 284,280 288,004 165,005 122,999 -3,724
.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
KOREA
SIXTII RAILWAY PROJECTS (LOAN 1542-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Unit Traffic Revenue and Cost - 1981
Traffic Total operatina Net oper. Unit Operating Unit net. Operating
(PK/TK Revenue Cost Varlable Fixed revenue Revenue Cost Variable FMxed oper.Rev. ratio
million) ----------- (won mil'ion) -------------- ----------------- (won) --- ----------- …()
Passonger
Saemaul Express 722 21,152 11,715 8,321 3,394 9,437 29.30 16.23 1.52 4.70 13.07 55.38
Ltd. Exp. (Air cond.) 2,040 32,923 17,172 12,099 5,073 15,751 16.14 8.42 5.93 2.49 7.72 52.16
Ltd. Express 6,790 75,362 47,715 32,516 15,199 27,647 11.09 7.02 4.79 2.24 4.07 63.31
Ord. Express 616 4,669 9,487 3,069 6,418 -4,818 6.58 15.40 4.98 10.42 -7.82 203.19
Ordinary 5,569 32,029 79,919 34,160 45,759 -47,890 4.75 14.35 6.13 8.22 -8.60 249.52
Seoul Urban 4,998 34,688 24,396 10,818 13,578 10,292 6.94 4.88 2,16 2.72 2.06 70.33
Hilitary 370 4,315 3,046 2,065 981 1,269 11.66 8.23 5.58 2.65 3.43 70.59
CoaQuter 436 4,567 14.089 5,900 8,189 -9,522 10.47 32.31 13.53 18.78 -21.84 308.50
Subtotal 21,544 209,705 207,539 108,948 98,591 2.166
Freight
Coal 4,413 56,916 60,362 40,267 20,095 -3,446 12.90 13.68 9.12 4.55 -0.78 106.05
Cement 1,783 24,676 24,971 16,312 8,659 -295 13.84 14.01 9.15 4.86 -0.17 101.20
Ores 963 12,090 12,140 8,668 3,472 -50 12.55 12.61 9.00 3.61 -0.05 100.41
Oil 660 10,976 10,054 6,032 4,022 922 16.63 15.23 9.14 6.09 1.40 91.60
Fertilizer 488 6,017 7,845 4,378 3,4f2 -1,823 12.33 16.07 8.97 7.09 -3.74 130.30
Grain 158 2,001 2,499 1,414 1,085 -498 12.66 15.82 8.95 6.87 -3.15 124.89
Container 229 3,066 1,960 1 188 722 1,l0( 13.39 6.56 5.19 3.37 4.83 63.93
Milscellanaous 1,560 17,504 22,462 13,959 8,503 -4,958 11.22 14.40 8.95 5.45 -3.18 128.32
Hlilitaty 374 3,940 6,049 3,331 2,718 -2,109 10.53 16.17 8.91 7.27 -5.64 153.54
KNR 177 3,341 3,379 1,774 1,635 -38 18.88 19.09 9.85 9.24 -0.21 101.14
Subtotal 10,805 140,527 151,716 97,293 54,423 -11,189
Total 32,349 350,232 359,255 206,241 153,014 -9,023
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Table 7. 1
XOREA
SIXTII RAILWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1542-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPO1eT
Grouping of Actual Project Capital Cost for Economic Analysis
Actual cost Z of
(Won mill'on) total
Capacity Increases
Lines 27,511
Motive power 25,750
Rolling stock - passenger 32,115
Rolling stock - freight 22,775
Telecommunications and power 879
Subtotal 109.O30 46.0
Vay and Structures Renewals 15,772 7.0
Seoul Urban N'etwork 1,079 0.5
Daejon Passerz.er Car Workshop 17,497 7.0
Hiscellaneous
Safety-related investments (Including
rail/road crossings acd safety sidings) 3,993
Line relocation part of larger industrial
development projects 9,870
Workshop improvezents 2,934
Hiscellaneous including right-of-way
improvements, buildings, housing, etc. 10,088
Subtotal 26,885 11.0
Total 170,263
Douable-Track Chun7 Bu! Line 67,628 23.0
GRAND TOTAL 237,891 100.0
KOREA
SIXTH ALVY PROJECT (LOAN 1542-K0)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Allocation of Actual Project Capital Costs of Capacity Increases
Between Passenger and Freight Services
(Hillion won)
Passenger services Frai;ht services
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 and 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 193 a Total
later later
Lines
Bypass lines 184 497 185 184 810 2,290 184 497 185 184 810 2,291 8,301
New crossing loops 578 1,201 23 - - - 577 1,201 23 - - - 3,603
Marshalling yards - - - - - - - - - - - -
Station yard extenslons - 70 79 196 - - - 345
Freight terminal. - - - - - - - 2,399 1,999 3,631 - - 8,029
Lengthening of crossing loops ~ - 411 _ _ _ 411 - - - - 822
Station buildings 1,297 1,242 - - - - 531 339 - - - - 3,409
Signaling 1,019 1,022 - - - - 480 481 - - - - 3,002
Subtotal 3,078 4,373 208 184 810 2t290 1,842 5,407 2,403 3.815 810 2,291 27,511 0%
Motive Power and Rolling Stock
New locomotives 3,583 - 2,241 - - - 3,882 - 2,429 - - - 12,135
Remodeled locomotives - 3,143 2,438 - - - - 3,405 2,642 - - - 11,628
Remodeled rail cars and heating
cars 684 637 - - - - - - - 1,321
Breakdown cranes - - 319 - - - - - 347 - - 666
Cars (passenger and freight) 462 12,186 19,467 - - 569 .12,555 9,651 - - - 54,890
Subtotal 4,729 15,966 24,465 _ - 4,451 15,960 15,069 80,640
Telecommunications and Power 89 482 - - - - 48 260 - - - - 879
Total 7,896 20,821 24,673 184 810 2,290 6,341 21,627 17,472 3,815 810 2,291 109,030
Double-track Chung Bug line - - - - - 6,545 29,697 31,386 - - - 67,628
GRAND TOTAL 7,896 20,821 24,673 184 810 2,290 12,886 51,324 48,858 3,815 810 2,291 176,658
Total passengers - 56,674 or 32% Total freight - 119,984 or 68X
.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I-
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Table 7. 3
KOREA
SIXTE RAILWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1542-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Economic Return on Capacity Increase for Freight Services
Economic cost
savings from
Capital costs /a Traffic that would alternative nodes /d
Constant 1976 have diverted without Constant 1976
Year Actual prices lb capacity increases Actual prices /b
- (Won million) -- (million tonw-k) /c - ('Won million)-
1978 12,900 11,060 270 6,615 5,670
1979 51,300 i7;070 460 10,764 7,780
1980 48,900 25,430 280 7,868 4,090
1981 3,800 1,610 390 13,182 5,600
1982 800 323 480 17,280 6,980
1983 2,300 876 500 - 7,270
1984-89 - - 1,000 - 14,500
1990-2003 - - 1,500 - 21,750
ERR 18.8%
/a Rounded figures allocated to freight traffic (see Table 11).
lb Deflator indices used are indicated in para. 3.26, except for mid-1983 which
is estimated at 262.48.
/c Estimated figures for 1984 till 2003 based on ample capacity made available
by the double-tracking of the Chung Bug line.
Id Based on actual savings per ton-km between rail and trucking costs valued at
V 24.5, W 23.4, W 28.1 and W 33.8 respectively in 1978, 1979, 1980 and 1981.
Savings for 1982 are estimated ar W 36 based on 6% inflation (or at W 14..
in 1976 prices).
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Table 7.4
KOREA
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJFCT (LOAN 1542-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Economic Return on Capacity Increase for Passenper Services
Traffic added by
Capital costs /a the project Operating profits /c
Constant 1976 Special Limited Special Limited Total Constant 1976
Year Actual prices /b express express express express (actual) prices /b
--- (Won million)7- - (Million pass-km) -- (Won million) 
1978 7,890 6,770 95 1,900 711 5,624 6,375 5,470
1979 20,820 15,040 220 2.370 2,189 8,508 10,697 7,730
1980 24,670 12,830 250 2,050 3,100 9,593 12,673 6,590
1981 180 80 170 2,420 2,222 9,869 12,071 5,130
1982 810 330 90 2,780 1,260 11,120 12,380 5,000
1983 2,290 870 200 2,800 - - - 5,330
1984-2003 - - 200 2,800 - - - 5,330
ERR = 28.3X
/a Rounded figures allocated to passenger traffic (see Table 11).
/b Deflator indices used are indicated in para. 3.26, except for mid-1983 which is estimated
at 262.48.
Ic Differences between operating costs, excluding depreciation and revenues; i.e.: for special
express W 7.48, W 9.95, W 12.40, W 13.07 ane W 14.0; and for limited express W 2.96, W 3.59,
W 4.67, W 4.07 and W 4.0 from 1978 to 1982 respectively.
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KOREA
SEVENTH RAI LWAY PROJECT
RECOMMENDED KNR ORGANIZATION
SECRETARY
DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR DEPUTY ADMIN ISTRATOR DEPUTY ADMIN ISTRATOR
PLANNING COORDINATION ADMINISTRATION OPERATIONS
AND CONTROL
I ~MARKETING
AND
SALES
Planning and Budgeting Personnel Transportation
Business Management Training Civil Engineering
and Developmeont Accounting Electrlic Engineering
Managemrent Information Procurement and Material Rolling Stock
Intemnat Audit EDP Backshiops
SecuritV and Safety Container Operations
Restaurants and Hospitals
Regional Bureaus
Source: Consultants and Miseion
World Bank - 20995
- 69 -
ATTACHMENT
ZCZC DIST9138 RTVOOIB
SSP RETRIEVED MESSAGE
IN:. RCA 2326 042400f3 OUlT: P.TT 97 ' 4?4*.7.
DIST9l07 RCA2326
DIST
REF : TCP FCA
OEDDR
TXD5559 KRN119
UJRWA Hi. KRSE 047
SEOUI. 47/46 23 3.93S
LT
INTRAFRAD
WASHINGTON D.C.r
FOR MR. SHIV S. KAPLIR DfIRFCTR F PnP- Cc FRATIcN!N FC.ALLI.,I ln.
DEPARHTMENT RF.FERFNCE YOUR lET-.TER 'lE MAR:F %CH F?-C4 RFl:FGADTh
PROJFCT COMPLETTON RFPORT ON KORFEA FiXT-H RAIL;WY PRt?.!CT
UNDIER 1542-KO PLFASE BE TINFORMED "HA 'H E HAVE i.O F'.sR'HER
COMMFNCr ON THF SAID RFPORT RFSARDS KNFR S rt.-TL
Clt. LT MARCH..20lTF!TH1984 1T'J42-KCi
CHINA~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ID 33
CUI4 -/ DEMAOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPLUBLIC OFOKOREA 
J ~~~~~~~-c-,_East Sea
Of ~JAJMN 
U.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~CMNE1
-. - i ugiosias~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~m
~~ 7 sa~~~~~uaSA
-37
A. .. aG tin O.vV .. M
LtG .WtES ~
GefcaO eye tin l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ an
.lfcO AM L-ES It-0 ym l&MOEA
dTfo, *lD. "ior 1.-S
G1ffA.O G tinL- S.inb - CtM
MON. Jl. L-A I -V
YellaoD mtyow -Sea pw AN
Uk PIONC L"IES ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ EPBLCOfKOE
SW MLA* S~~~~~~~~~~ TRN.PRT SETO
SFWA ~~~M V.~ - A.-M S~~~~~~- M* erw
2~~~ L-W 0kh"GIVEON~~~~.LEIUIE U
YSeloSe

